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Rail Accident Report: Partial failure of Bridge 94, near Bromsgrove, 6 April 2011

Document Summary

The report on the collapse of a culvert at Bromsgrove in 2011.

This document was published in March 2012 by Rail Accident Investigation Branch.

It was written by Rail Accident Investigation Branch.

This item is linked to the Accident at Bromsgrove on 6th April 2011

The original document format was PDF File, and comprised 43 pages.The original document can be found here.

This document was kindly sourced from Rail Accident Investigation Branch and is in our Accident reports collection. It was added to the Archive on 25th March 2012 by the Archivist.

Copyright Information

This document is Crown Copyright, and is subject to the terms governing the reproduction of crown copyright material. Depending on the status and age of the original document, you may need an OPSI click-use license if you wish to reproduce this material, and other restrictions may apply. Please see this explanation for further details.

"On Wednesday 6 April 2011, an assistant track section manager (ATSM) employed by Network Rail discovered a structure (Bridge 94, on the main line between Birmingham and Gloucester) supporting the track which he believed to be collapsing. He was on site to check a hole in the ballast under sleepers on the down main line, first identified during a routine track inspection eight days previously, which had reappeared despite being filled with clean ballast.

The ATSM arranged for track maintenance staff to attend site during the evening to monitor the track. They discovered that ballast was falling into a watercourse under each passing train, and reported the failure to Network Rail's fault control. Staff on site arranged an emergency speed restriction, followed by the diversion of trains onto other lines to bypass the failing structure. There were no injuries, but severe disruption continued until after emergency repairs were complete 36 hours later.

Nobody had inspected the part of the structure where the failure occurred since 2001 because neither Railtrack/Network Rail nor their structures examination contractor recognised the need for staff who were trained and equipped to enter a confined space to examine this structure. Consequently the condition of the part of the structure supporting the track was unknown.

The RAIB has identified one learning point from this incident: the importance of undertaking reconnaissance visits as an integral part of the planning process for detailed examinations.

The RAIB has also made recommendations to Network Rail that focus on improving the awareness of structures which are not easily visible from track level, and improving the structures examination regime.
"

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