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view document PDF (1.5Mb download)Report On The Accident That Occurred On 28th February 1975 At Moorgate Station On The Northern Line London Transport Railways

Document Summary

The Moorgate tube crash led to changes in the way tube services were operated into terminus stations.

This document was published on 4th March 1976 by Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

It was written by Department of the Environment.


This item is linked to the Accident at Moorgate on 28th February 1975


The original document format was Stapled Book, and comprised 27 pages.

This document was kindly sourced from Wobbly Bob and is in our Accident reports collection. It was added to the Archive on 21st July 2005.

Copyright Information

This document is Crown Copyright, and is subject to the terms governing the reproduction of crown copyright material. Depending on the status and age of the original document, you may need an OPSI click-use license if you wish to reproduce this material, and other restrictions may apply. Please see this explanation for further details.

"Whatever the reasons for Motorman Newson's lapse, I am satisfied that there was nothing in his behaviour prior to leaving Old Street on the final run that could possibly have caused any other member of the staff any worry or suspicion as to his driving capability. This particularly applies to Guard Harris who, in addition to being young and inexperienced, which he could not help, displayed himself as idle and undisciplined. Apart from being late for duty, he went to the rear cab shortly after leaving Old Street to look for a newspaper and still had not returned to the guard's position by the time the collision occurred. He clearly paid no attention to the running of the train and only became aware that something was amiss when he saw the station lights at Moorgate less than a second before the head of the train entered the sand drag. Even if he had been paying particular attention lo the running of the train, I do not believe he could have been expected to realise that anything was wrong until the last car entered the crossover, by which time the front of the train was halfway along the platform and an emergency brake application could not have prevented the accident. Apart from this, it would not have been easy for a young and inexperienced guard to come to a decision to make an emergency brake application on a train driven by a driver in whom he had confidence. In my view Guard Harris's behaviour cannot be regarded as having contributed in any way to the accident.

I must conclude, therefore, that the cause of this accident lay entirely in the behaviour of Motorman Newson during the final minute before the accident occurred. Whether his behaviour was deliberate or whether it was the result of a suddenly arising physical condition not revealed as a result of post-mortem examination, there is not sufficient evidence to establish, but I am satisfied that no part of the responsibility for the accident rests with any other person and that there was no fault or condition of the train, track, or signalling that in any way contributed to it."

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