4th. From the want of presence of mind in the signalman at the Whitmore station.

I would recommend that when pilot engines are sent with express trains from Crewe, and it is the intention to shunt the pilot engines at Whitmore, the express train should stop at the Whitmore station while the pilot is being detached and shunted out of the way; and I would further recommend that the drivers of pilot engines be directed always to cross from one line to the other at a station, and not at any intermediate crossing. The London and North Western Company have already directed semaphore signals to be erected at *all* crossings and sidings, and I would recommend them further to appoint their own servants to work the points and signals and crossings, and to require them always to be present at their posts, the expense of such improved working being part of the charge made by the Company to the private owner.

I have, &c.

Captain Galton, R.E.,
&c. &c.

R. M. LAFFAN,
Capt. Royal Engineers.

London and North Western Railway, Secretary's Office,
Euston Station, London, October 5, 1852.

SIR,

I AM instructed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2d instant, with copy of the report of the inspecting officer of his inquiry into the circumstances attending the collision which occurred on the 5th August at Hatton Coal Wharf, and which shall be laid before the Directors at their next meeting.

I have, &c.

Captain Simmons, R.E.,
&c. &c.

CHAS. STEWART,
Secretary.

APPENDIX No. 34.

LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, November 10, 1852.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, for the information of the Directors of the London and North Western Railway Company, a copy of the report which their Lordships have received from the officer appointed by them to inquire into the circumstances attending the collision which took place at the Camden station on the 25th October, between the mail train and an engine which was crossing the railway.

My Lords desire me to request that you will inform the Directors, that although this accident appears in a great measure to be attributable to the carelessness of the driver, my Lords regret to perceive that the regulations with respect to this crossing do not appear to have been framed with that exactitude which a level crossing of a railway of the importance of the London and North Western at Camden would appear to require.

It appears to their Lordships that such an important crossing of the main line as this appears to be should not be allowed to be worked by mere verbal directions, but that written instructions should have been given to the persons entrusted with the working of it, which should, in addition, have been thoroughly explained to them.

It also appears to their Lordships that a crossing of this character should be entirely under the control of one individual, so that there should be no doubt as to the responsibility attached to its working, and that no engine should on any account be allowed through the points at either end until the line is clear for it to pass, the person in charge of the crossing being answerable that the line is clear, and that the crossing is duly protected against passing trains by signals.

With respect to the conduct of the pointsman in fastening the points so that an engine was able to proceed upon the main line without his being at the points to hold them open, my Lords desire me to inform you that, whatever the practice may be with respect to points in stations which do not lead into the main line, it appears to their Lordships that points which lead on to the main line are of such importance that the arrangement of them, as decided upon by the responsible officers of the Company, ought on no account to be interfered with, and therefore that the conduct of the pointsman in interfering with them is deserving of severe reprehension.

My Lords desire me further to inform you, that they have communicated to the Postmaster General, pointing out the importance of the mails arriving at the Euston Station in time for the bags to be transferred to the railway post office van before the time appointed for the starting of the train.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the
London and North Western Railway Company.

J. L. A. SIMMONS,
Capt Royal Engineers.

Appendix No. 34.

ACCIDENTS.

London and North Western Railway.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, November 2, 1852.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to lay before you the following report upon the subject of the accident which occurred at the Camden station of the London and North Western railway, on the 25th October, in consequence of a collision between the 10 o'clock A.M. down mail train and a goods engine.

The train appears to have left Euston Square station at 10.6 A.M., that is to say, six minutes late, having been detained for the mail bags from the Post Office.

It consisted of fourteen carriages, including the guards vans. It is customary for a pilot engine to assist all trains up the incline between the Euston and Camden stations, and when the train is not too heavy to be drawn on its journey by one engine, the pilot engine is detached at a short distance below the top of the incline, and, running on, is turned through facing points into a siding, whilst the train follows at a moderate speed, and at such a distance behind the pilot engine, as will allow of the points being replaced in their proper positions for continuing the train on the main line. In the instance in question the engine driver states that he caused the pilot engine to be detached when he got half-way up the incline, as his train was light. The pilot engine arrived at the top of the incline two minutes before the train, and went into the siding, whilst the train went on at a speed of about twelve or fourteen miles per hour.

I have appended to this report a drawing which shows the station arrangements at Camden, so far as they relate to the present accident, and a reference to it will elucidate the following description.

The train had almost reached the bridge (marked A on the plan) which crosses both lines, and connects the platforms with the East and West India Docks and Birmingham Junction Railway, when the driver perceived that an engine was moving slowly on to the crossing C. Every exertion was immediately made to stop the train, but a collision ensued notwithstanding, which threw both the engines off the line, but most fortunately did not seriously injure any of the passengers.

The engine which was in the crossing was a goods engine, driven by Samuel Ashbery, and it was on its way from the engine sheds to the goods station, from whence it was to take a train at 10.40, it being the duty of goods engine drivers to go to their trains half an hour before the hour of starting.

In proceeding from the engine sheds to the goods station it is necessary to pass by the points marked B. These points are constructed so as to be always open to the siding E, and it is intended that no engine should go through them to the crossing of the main line C, unless they are opened by the policeman at B.

The points at B were laid in, in the manner shown on the plan, on the 18th June 1851, and it is stated that until within about two months they were worked by a man stationed at the opposite side of the line, but since that time they have been transferred to the charge of the policeman at B.

After an engine has passed through the points B it is stated by the officers of the Company to be the duty of the driver to wait for a signal from the policeman at D before he crosses the line; but the pointsman at D stated that his custom is "to signal to the driver and to the pointsman too, by calling out to him to let the engine through the points," and that "the pointsman at B *very seldom* lets an engine through without my waving my flag, or calling out to him." I have taken an opportunity of watching an engine pass the points, and observed that the pointsman at D signalled to the pointsman at B before the latter allowed the engine to pass. In consequence of the siding E E being full of waggons on the night before the accident occurred, the pointsman (Gray) on duty at B B blocked back the points to prevent engines from running against the waggons. Gray went off duty at 6.30 A.M., and was succeeded by a man named Crofts, who had only been on the post a fortnight. Gray informed him that the points were blocked, and told him to warn the drivers of it. When the engine driver, Ashbery was about to cross the line, he informed the pointsman (Crofts) at B B of his intention. Crofts, who was occupied near B, called out to him that the points were all right. Ashbery states, that he then moved on, looking towards D for a signal; but the pointsman was absent from D, being occupied at one of his other points. Ashbery, in the absence of a signal, assumed that the line was safe, and moving slowly on attempted to cross the main line. When, however, he had almost reached the crossing, he perceived the mail train approaching, and reversing his engine he came to a stand exactly on the main line.

Upon the causes of this accident I beg to offer the following remarks:—In the first place, it appears that the train left Euston Square at 10.6 A.M. instead of ten o'clock, the time named in the Company's time tables; but it is to be observed that 10 A.M. is the latest time allowed for the arrival of passengers, and some time must necessarily elapse between that and the departure of the train. The delay in this case was due to the mail bags having been late. With respect to this, I have appended hereunto a list showing from the 2d to the 27th October the time when the last bag was transferred every day from the van to the railway post office, and the time when the train left the Euston station, from which it will be perceived that the mail bags were twelve times late,—in some instances as much as eight minutes. The train itself, however, was in three instances as much as thirteen minutes late.

The next cause of the accident appears to have been the blocking back of the points. Upon this I would observe, that in the goods sidings, when waggons require to be shunted

through two or three sets of points, it is customary for some to be blocked back whilst others are held. This may have had some influence in making Gray think too lightly of the danger attendant upon blocking back the points at B, and the distance of about 140 yards which he would have to walk every time the points required shifting would probably also have influenced his mind upon the subject.

These causes, however, would not have caused the accident, had not the driver Ashbery attempted to move across the line without a signal. His doing so was an act of gross carelessness. He states in his defence that he had been at the Camden station about twenty times before, and that he had invariably taken his signal to cross from the pointsman at B, who in the present instance told him the points were all right. It would appear, however, that he must have had some doubts as to crossing, as he states he looked for a signal in front. That he did not receive a signal was due to the absence of the pointsman from D.

This man has to superintend about twelve pairs of points, some of which are self-acting, for the goods sidings, and only require cleaning; others require his presence on the passage of trains. Of these latter, one is near D, and another near D, so that he has duties which are incompatible with his being at all times on the south side of the Chalk Farm Bridge; and it is to be observed that the absence of a signalman at D may in some measure have misled Ashbery.

From a consideration of the circumstances, one of the following suggestions occurs, as being desirable for ensuring the safety of the line, viz., either that the pointsman at B should not allow engines to pass the points until he has communicated with the pointsman at D, and satisfied himself that the line is clear, or, which would be a far more desirable plan, that an additional pointsman should be stationed near the crossing C, over which he should have complete control, and take charge of the points at B, and of some of the points adjacent to C or D, so that the duties of the several pointsmen should be concentrated as much as possible.

I have, &c.

Captain Simmons, R.E.,
&c. &c.

DOUGLAS GALTON,
Capt. Royal Engineers.

RETURN of the Departure from Euston of the 10 A.M. down Mail Train from the 1st to the 27th October 1852.

Date.		Train left Euston Station.	Time of last Bag transferred from Van to the Railway Post Office.	Date.		Train left Euston Station.	Time of last Bag transferred from Van to the Railway Post Office.
1852.				1852.			
October	1	—	—	October	15	10.7	9.59
„	2	10.12	10.8	„	16	10.13	10.4
„	3	10.4	Sunday.	„	17	10.3	Sunday.
„	4	10.13	9.58	„	18	10.7	10.4
„	5	10.7	10.3	„	19	10.5	10.3
„	6	10.3	9.58	„	20	10.3	9.50
„	7	10.4	10.	„	21	10.8	10.
„	8	10.9	10.5	„	22	10.4	10.1
„	9	10.13	10.8	„	23	10.11	10.4
„	10	10.3	Sunday.	„	24	10.6	Sunday.
„	11	10.8	10.4	„	25	11.33*	10.6
„	12	10.3	9.58	„	26	10.9	10.3
„	13	10.3	9.59	„	27	10.4	9.59
„	14	10.3	10.				

* Accident at Camden.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, November 10, 1852.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to state to you, for the information of his Lordship the Postmaster General, that in a report which they have received from the officer appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the circumstances attending the collision which occurred at Camden on the London and North Western Railway on the 25th October, their Lordships are informed that the mail train, to which the accident happened, was late in starting from Euston station. The inspecting officer appended to his report a return which was furnished to him by the Company, a copy of which is enclosed, from which his Lordship will perceive that the time at which the last mail bag was transferred to the railway post office carriage from the van in which the bags are brought from the Post Office was frequently a few minutes after the hour advertised for the departure of the train.

Appendix No. 34.

ACCIDENTS.

London and North Western Railway.

My Lords desire me to request that you will bring this circumstance to the attention of his Lordship, as my Lords are quite confident that it requires only to be brought to his Lordship's notice to secure that punctuality which is so essential in conducting the traffic upon railways, and to remove any grounds of excuse on the part of the Railway Companies in the event of accidents occurring in any measure attributable to want of punctuality in their trains.

I have, &c.

Colonel Maberly. J. L. A. SIMMONS,
Capt. Royal Engineers.

London and North Western Railway, Secretary's Office,
Euston Station, London, November 12, 1852.

SIR,

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, enclosing report upon the subject of the accident which occurred at the Camden station on the 25th ultimo, and which shall be brought under the notice of the Directors.

I have, &c.

Captain Simmons, R.E., CHAS. STEWART,
&c. &c. *Secretary.*

General Post Office, December 7, 1852.

SIR,

THE Postmaster General has had before him your communication of the 10th ultimo, on the subject of the collision which occurred at Camden, on the London and North Western Railway, on the 25th October.

I am desired to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that his Lordship is fully aware of the necessity of a punctual despatch of the mail trains; but he directs me to point out that on Monday mornings (as in the instance in question), and on other days when the mails are unusually heavy, the delay of a few minutes in the despatch of the train is frequently unavoidable.

His Lordship directs me to add, that particular instructions have been issued, with a view to ensuring the greatest possible punctuality in future.

I have, &c.

Captain Simmons, R.E., J. L. MABERLY.
&c. &c.

Appendix No. 35.

London and North Western Railway.

APPENDIX No. 35.

LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, December 16, 1852.

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the copy of the report that has been received from Captain Galton, the officer appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred near the Huyton station on the Liverpool and Manchester Line on the 2d instant.

I am also to transmit to you a copy of a report upon the same accident which was made by Captain Wynne, another of the inspecting officers of the Board, who happened to be in the neighbourhood at the time of the occurrence; and I am to point to you, for the information of the Directors, that both of these officers have reported that the condition of the Liverpool and Manchester line is such as fully to account for the accident, and that this line, in its present condition, is not safe for passenger traffic at high speed.

Captain Galton has also reported to their Lordships that, notwithstanding the bad state of the line, due in some measure to the continued rain, the Company had thought proper to accelerate the trains over it, and that this accident occurred on the first day on which the trains had run at the increased speed.

My Lords direct me to observe, that the condition of the permanent way, as reported by their officers, appears to call for the most serious attention of the Company; and that although my Lords are willing to make every allowance for the peculiar difficulties to which Railway Companies have been subject in consequence of the long continuance of wet weather, it is with regret that my Lords have read the report of their officer as to the condition of the rails, the keys, and the intervals between the sleepers, all matters which are independent of the effects of weather.

My Lords also regret to learn that the Company's officers should have permitted the trains to be accelerated while the permanent way remained in the bad condition in which it was; and I am directed to request you to urge upon the consideration of the Directors the statements in these reports, in the hope that they will see fit immediately to adopt such measures as shall tend more effectually to secure the safety of passengers while passing over this railway.