

The guards also have an order that if at any time they found a train entering the Euston station at higher speed than usual they are to apply their breaks without reference to the bank-riders; and if Henry Collins, the under guard of the train to which this accident happened, who was in the leading carriage, with a powerful break at his command, had applied it, as he ought, the train would no doubt have been stopped before arriving at the end of the platform. There were only ten carriages, and the rails and wheels quite dry.

Collins is suspended for the decision of the Traffic Committee.

Captain Huish.

Truly yours,  
H. P. BRUYERES.

Appendix No. 30.  
—  
ACCIDENTS.  
—  
London and North  
Western Railway.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
March 23, 1852.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 20th inst, enclosing reports of the superintendent of traffic and carriage builder of the London and North Western Railway Company, with reference to the recent accident at the Euston station.

Captain Huish.  
London and North Western Railway Company.

I have, &c.  
J. L. A. SIMMONS,  
Capt. Royal Engineers.

APPENDIX No. 31.

LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY.

Appendix No. 31.  
—  
London and North  
Western Railway.

SIR,

26th June 1852.

I HAVE the honour of laying before you the following report upon the accident which occurred on the Aylesbury branch of the London and North Western Railway on the 11th instant, in consequence of the 1.45 p.m. train from Aylesbury to Cheddington having run off the line.

The train consisted of an engine and tender, and six carriages including the guard's van, in the following order:

Engine,  
Tender,  
Guard's Break Van,  
2d Class Carriage with a Break,  
2d Class Carriage,  
1st Class Carriage,  
1st Class Carriage,  
2d Class Carriage.

The engine was one of Bury's engines on four wheels, weighing between 13 and 14 tons, of which 8 tons are on the driving wheels, and the remainder on the fore wheels; the driving wheels are 5 feet 6 inches in diameter, and the fore wheels 4 feet in diameter; the cylinders are 14 inches diameter, the length of stroke 18 inches. The line at the place where the accident occurred is perfectly straight and nearly level, the general inclination being on the ascent towards Cheddington.

The train started from Aylesbury at 1.46 p.m., and proceeded at a speed of from 25 to 28 miles per hour till it arrived within 1½ mile of Cheddington, when suddenly the engine went off the rails to the right of the line, and after tearing up some of the roadway and sleepers, was upset in the adjacent ditch, the tender was dragged off the line on the same side and upset, but the coupling between the tender and the guard's van broke, and the buffer of the guard's van appears to have struck the tender after this latter had left the rails, and was thrown together with three other carriages off the line on the opposite or left side; these carriages were all upset, the two rear carriages remained upright, with their wheels off the rails.

The point at which the engine left the line was at a joint between two rails where the key remained firmly fixed in the chair, and for three or four lengths from this point the rails were not displaced, but farther on, the left-hand wheels of the engine had, in crossing the right-hand rail, torn up some lengths, and the sleepers on which these wheels had travelled were a good deal broken; some of the broken sleepers seemed much decayed.

I have examined carefully the two rails adjoining the joint at which the engine left the line, and I also examined the rails on the other side of the line, but I have not been able to discover any evidence of the train having been thrown off the line by anything placed upon it.

I therefore turned my attention to the line itself, and have gone carefully over the whole of the line between Cheddington and Aylesbury, and examined at intervals the sleepers and the ballast.

Appendix No. 31.

## ACCIDENTS.

London and North  
Western Railway.

The Aylesbury branch of the London and North Western Railway has been opened for 13 years. It is laid with rails of the accompanying section, having parallel top and bottom flanges—and weighing 65 lbs. per yard. The rails are supported by chairs at 4 feet intervals. There were instances of the rails having become laminated, but although they seemed all to have been in use a long time they appear in fair order. The sleepers in some few instances I found to be unsound. The ballast which has been used is in some parts of the line a mixture of flint and chalk, and in other parts sand. The subsoil is a strong blue clay or gault clay, and this in many cases—in cuttings particularly—has forced itself up through the ballast between the sleepers, leaving the ballast still under the sleepers. The depth of the ballast, however, did not in any place where I examined it exceed from 1 foot to 1 foot 3 inches in depth, and in most cases it was only 9 inches deep under the sleepers, and had become very much deteriorated by being mixed with the clay of the subsoil. In places the drainage appears scarcely sufficient, or the drains have become stopped. I tested the gauge of the line in numerous places; the standard gauge is 4 feet 8½ inches, and this is the gauge used in the locomotive department for regulating the interval between a pair of wheels; but besides this gauge, there is one of 4 feet 8 inches which is used at points and crossings.

In gauging the Aylesbury branch I found that in that part of the line near to where the accident occurred the interval between the rails appeared to suit this latter gauge better than the other one, and was in many instances tight even for that gauge; the effect of this would be to force the flange of the wheel against the rail, and cause a tendency in the wheel to rise on and ride over the rail.

I have annexed a sketch showing the condition of the two rails adjacent to the joint at which the accident occurred.

The rail on the near side of the joint exhibited marks of abrasion for a foot or 18 inches from the joint, as if a piece had been cut off by the flange of the wheel (the opposite side of this rail had laminated); the other rail, the end of which met the wheel, was sheared in the manner shown in the sketch, and the sheared piece appeared to have guided the flange of the wheel off the rail. The off fore wheel of the engine exhibited marks of abrasion.

It appears to me that the accident has occurred from the gauge being tight, the leading wheel of the engine pressed off the edge of the first rail, but on meeting with the end of the second one, sheared it and went off the line.

Upon this accident I have to make the following observations, viz.:

The line was originally laid with a rail lighter than those now generally adopted, and these rails are supported by bearings 4 feet apart.

Laid in this way, the line is not fitted for the heavy engines and high speeds in use on the main line. In consequence of this it is not the custom (as I was informed) to allow any other class of engines than the one to which the accident occurred to travel on the railway. This class of engine, however, has a weight of from 4 to 4½ tons on each of the driving wheels, to support which a permanent way of the above description ought to be in very good order, and particularly free from unsound sleepers.

It is therefore extremely desirable that the Company should cause a thorough examination of the road to be made with a view to the removal of any unsound sleepers, to the addition of ballast in those places where there is not at present a sufficiency, or where the ballast has become deteriorated from the admixture of clay, and to the improvement of the drainage where required.

It is also very undesirable that the gauge of a railway generally should be tighter than that of the wheels of the vehicles upon it on account of the increased traction, and the wear and tear it occasions, as well as on account of the tendency it has to cause an engine or carriage to leave the rails.


In conclusion, I would draw attention to the fact that the break carriage in which the guard rode was in front instead of in rear of the train, and that this is a violation of the Company's rules. There was with the train, in addition to the guard's break van, a second-class carriage with a break and a compartment for the guard, which was placed next to the van, instead of being placed at the opposite end of the train, where it would have acted as a break van.

Judging from other cases in which trains have run off a line of railway, I think it highly probable that had the guard been on a break carriage at the rear of the train, and had he been keeping a good look out, the application of the breaks immediately after the engine had left the rails might have averted much of the injury which has resulted to the carriages, and at any rate the man's own life would have been saved.


I have, &amp;c.

Captain Simmons, R.E.,  
&c. &c.

DOUGLAS GALTON,  
Capt. Royal Engineers.



Appendix No. 9L  
 ACCIDENTS.  
 London and North  
 Western Railway.



*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
 Whitehall, June 28, 1852.*

Sir,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you a copy of the report they have received from the officer appointed by them to inquire into the circumstances attending an accident which occurred on the Aylesbury Branch of the London and North Western Railway on the 11th instant, and to request you to bring to the attention of the Directors the observations contained therein, with respect to the permanent way of the railway, and especially with respect to the breach of the Company's regulations as to the position of the guard in the train to which this accident happened.

*The Secretary of the  
 London and North Western Railway Company.*

I have, &c.  
 J. L. A. SIMMONS,  
 Capt. Royal Engineers.

Appendix No. 31.

ACCIDENTS.

London and North  
Western Railway.

SIR,

*London and North Western Railway,  
General Manager's Office, Euston Station, July 7, 1852.*

IN answer to your letter under date the 28th ultimo, I am desired to hand you copy of the report from the Superintendent, which it is hoped will be satisfactory. The subject of the permanent way has been specially referred to the Works Committee.

I am, &amp;c.

MARK HUISH.

*Captain Simmons, R.E.,  
&c. &c.*

(Copy.)

*London and North Western Railway, Superintendent's Office,  
Euston Station, July 6, 1851.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I RETURN you herewith Captain Galton's report on the recent accident on the Aylesbury line.

The accident having happened on a branch line over which the trains have to run in an *opposite* direction to that over the main line, the guard was not in his wrong position next to the tender.

On the main line the guards are kept in the rear of the trains, that in the event of a portion of a train breaking away, the guard is always left to signal the following train; but on coming to a junction at which the engine has to hook on to the other end of the train to take it forward to its destination, the guard must necessarily be next the tender.

Allen is the first instance of a passenger guard being killed in an accident since the opening of the London and Birmingham Railway.

Allen was riding next the tender in charge of a short train, but it does not follow as a matter of course that had Allen been in the rear of the train his life would have been spared.

I believe the chief risk to a guard is in being in a standing position instead of seated, and the violence with which he is hurled against some part of the van causes the injury. There is no doubt it was so in this case.

I am, &amp;c.

H. P. BRUYERES.

*Captain Huish.*

## APPENDIX No. 32.

Appendix No. 32.

London and North  
Western Railway

## LONDON AND NORTH WESTERN RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, August 18, 1852.*

SIR,

I HAVE been directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a report they have received from their inspecting officer of his inquiry into the accident which occurred on the London and North Western Railway on the 3d instant, between Hampton and Coventry, through the falling off of the ash-pan of the engine.

My Lords direct me to request you to call the particular attention of the Directors of the London and North Western Railway Company to the necessity of enforcing a constant careful supervision of every part of the machinery used in the conveyance of passengers, and to observe that a heavy responsibility must rest upon the Directors when accidents occur, either from faulty workmanship, or from the neglect of frequent and minute examinations of the machinery.

My Lords direct me further to point out that in the concluding paragraph of his report their inspecting officer recommends that an improved mode of fastening should be adopted for the ash-pans in six engines which he specifies, and my Lords trust that the Directors of the London and North Western Railway Company will give this recommendation their serious consideration.

I have, &amp;c.

DOUGLAS GALTON.

*The Secretary of the  
London and North Western Railway Company.*

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, August 13, 1852.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report to you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances attending a collision which took place on the morning of the 3d instant, upon the London and North Western Railway about a mile to the southward of the Hampton station.