

There is one other important subject, also, to which it is right that I should draw attention, in connexion with the present inquiry, though it has nothing to do with the cause of the accident.

It will have been observed that there was a carriage behind the last van of the passenger train; and this is, though not an uncommon, yet always an objectionable arrangement. The Lancashire and Yorkshire Company are now constructing and employing break-vans of an improved description, (for which great credit is due to their carriage superintendent,) affording to the guard an excellent means of seeing along the top and sides of his train, and of observing, through glass, the progress and condition of the carriages before him at each moment; and they have set an excellent example to the other great companies in the application of continuous breaks, by means of which many accidents may be prevented altogether, by which those may be rendered comparatively harmless which would be otherwise attended with serious results, and by which an excellent means of communication may be provided between the guard and the driver; but they deprive these good arrangements of

a great part of their advantage when they attach vehicles behind the guard's van, and I trust they will be induced to prevent this practice from being adopted for the future. It appears to be the custom, under authority, for a carriage to be attached at the tail of this train, for the sake of greater convenience in placing it with the Bradford portion of the train at Rochdale; but it was only the other day that a carriage so attached was dragged for miles on another railway, without the guard or the driver of the train being aware of it, after it had lost its wheels and axles; and the risk that is attendant, for this and other reasons, upon the practice, ought to be sufficient to prevent its being constantly adopted, for the mere avoidance of a little extra trouble, and, perhaps, a slight delay at a station at which a change in the arrangement of the train has subsequently to be effected.

*The Secretary,
Railway Department,
Board of Trade.*

I have, &c.
W. H. TYLER,
Capt. R.E.

LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, 21st March 1861.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, for the consideration of the Directors of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., the Officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 30th January last near the Ford Station.

I have, &c.

JAMES BOOTH.

*The Secretary to the
London, Brighton, and South-Coast
Railway Company.*

SIR,

York, 18th March 1861.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 2d ultimo, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 30th January last, near the Ford Station of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway.

To the east of that station there is a sliding bridge over the river Arun, carrying only one line of rails; and the points which connect the double lines with the single line of rails at the two ends of that bridge are under the charge of two pointsmen, one to each pair of points.

A double semaphore signal on the east of the bridge is considered as the governing signal, employed for the protection of the bridge and the single line passing over it. There are distant signals, working in each direction; and the station signal is not permitted to be lowered for the passage of a train from the westward, excepting when the signal on the east of the bridge is lowered also. A small wire signal communicates from the station to the west of the bridge.

On the 30th January, the 6 a.m. passenger train from Portsmouth, consisting of an engine and tender, 5 carriages, and 2 break-vans, approached the Ford Station about four minutes late; and the driver found the signals lowered for him to pass the station and bridge in the usual manner. He proceeded over the bridge at 14 or 15 miles an hour, which is the greatest speed permitted at this point by the Company's regulations; and he saw the engine of another train

waiting upon the down line of rails, for his train to travel first over the single line. As soon as he had passed the points on the east of the bridge, he became aware that the pointsman had turned him on to the down line, instead of allowing him to proceed along his own line, and that a collision was inevitable. He had just time to reverse his engine, but no time to whistle for his breaks, before he struck the engine of the cattle train. He remained on his engine, and was not much hurt. The fireman, after giving his break-handle one or two turns, also tried to jump off; but he only succeeded in getting on the lower step of the engine before the collision occurred; and he was stunned, by being thrown upon the ballast between the two lines, and cut about the face.

The guard who was riding in the leading van, Alfred Moore, remembers having passed the Ford Station, but nothing more. He was found senseless in his break-van after the collision, and was evidently much hurt. There were fortunately only 3 passengers altogether, 2 soldiers and a pensioner, in the passenger train; and they do not appear to have suffered much from the shock. There were some butchers also in the cattle train, who were some of them hurt; so that about 6 persons, besides the above fireman and guard, may be said to have been injured, more or less, from the effects of the collision.

The pointsman, who occasioned this accident, is an old servant of the company, with an excellent character, and he had been at the same post for 12 months. He saw the cattle train approaching from Brighton, about 5 minutes late; and he says that the driver passed the distant signal with his steam on, and he was a little afraid that he would not stop short of the points leading to the single line. He also saw the passenger train approaching from the opposite direction, and he lowered his signals, according to his usual practice, for this latter train, while he kept his signals at danger against the cattle train. He admits his mistake in turning on the points for the up line, and in thus causing the passenger train to run the wrong way through them; and he says that he did so unwittingly, while looking round, with some anxiety, to see whether the cattle train had come to a stand sufficiently far from them to allow the passenger train to pass in safety. He did not perceive his error until after the engine had passed through the points; and he then considered, wisely, that it was better to keep them in the wrong position, rather than to alter them, and throw the passenger train off the line.

The driver of the cattle train denies having run past the distant signal with his steam on, and he is corroborated in his evidence in this respect, by his fireman and his two guards. He states that he brought his train to a stand about 100 yards short of the points, and had been so standing for about 3 minutes before the collision occurred. He and his fireman had time to jump off and get out of the way, after they saw that the passenger train had been turned the wrong way through the points. His tender wheels, and two or three of his cattle trucks, were thrown off the line, in consequence of the road having been burst out on one side.

The first breaksman of the cattle train also had time to jump out of his van, after perceiving that the passenger train had taken the wrong line; but the guard at the tail of the cattle train had not time to do so, and he received a contusion on the forehead.

It is admitted by the pointsman that this accident was caused by his mistake; and, as it appears that he only altered the points when the passenger train was within about 30 yards of him, it is plain that any indicating signal which might have been attached to them would not, in this instance, have been of much

use. At the same time, it is desirable, in cases of this sort, in which points have to be constantly altered for the passage of trains in different directions, either that they should be worked in connection with a main signal near them, according to the system which has of late been carried out so judiciously at the junctions upon this Railway, or else that they should be attached to a small indicating signal, so placed as to inform an approaching driver of the direction in which they are set, and whether it is safe for him to proceed through them.

The best remedy, in this particular case, would be the construction of a new bridge, and the doubling of this portion of the line; a measure which the company are anxious, I believe, to carry out as soon as possible; and it would be a prudent course in the meantime to make some such alteration (by working the points in connexion with a signal) as that which I have above referred to.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) H. W. TYLER,
Capt. R.E.

*The Secretary,
Board of Trade,
Whitehall.*

LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, 3d April, 1861.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, in order that it be laid before the Directors of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Colonel Yolland, R.E., the Officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances which attended the fatal accident that occurred on the 11th February last at the Crystal Palace Station.

I am, &c.

The Secretary to the JAMES BOOTH.
London, Brighton, and South Coast
Railway Company.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, 27th March 1861.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, in obedience to your minute of the 15th ult., the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the fatal accident that occurred on the 11th February at the Crystal Palace Station of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway, by which a female passenger, Mrs. Lynch, and a railway porter, Wm. Eager, lost their lives.

The west end of the Crystal Palace Station is situated about 75 yards east of the mouth of the Crystal Palace tunnel, which is somewhere about 800 yards in length, and Gipsy Hill Station, on the West End and Crystal Palace branch line is situated 53 chains east of the Crystal Palace Station. The tunnel is traversed by a double line of railway, and about 35 yards within the tunnel mouth, at its eastern end, a junction is formed between the two main lines which lead to Croydon and Brighton, and which go off to the right, and the Crystal Palace branch lines to London Bridge, which turn away to the left. The up and down main lines run parallel to each other from the mouth of the tunnel, but the up and down branch lines run through the station buildings some short distance apart.

Since the opening of the western extension of the London, Chatham, and Dover Railway, last December, there has been considerable passenger traffic to and from that line to London Bridge, and the passengers so proceeding exchange carriages at the Crystal Palace Station.

In consequence of the extreme proximity of the tunnel, and the very limited view which is obtained from the station of all trains arriving from Pimlico and Victoria Station, much pains have been taken to cover the junction and station by proper signals, and no train from Victoria Station is permitted to leave Gipsy Hill Station for the Crystal Palace until the signalman at the junction, who is stationed in a box about 25 yards outside the mouth of the tunnel, gives the signal that the line is clear; and as soon as a train coming from Victoria Station enters the tunnel, he rings a large hand-bell as a warning to persons on the platforms and to the company's servants. An up London, Chatham, and Dover train due at the Crystal Palace station at 9.50 a.m. arrived there at the proper time, and the passengers by it (20 to 30), who intended to proceed to London Bridge, got out of the train on to the south or up main line platform, and after giving up their tickets proceeded to take others for London Bridge. Among the number was a female passenger, Mrs. Lynch, who had only taken a ticket from Faversham to Strood, intending to proceed by the North Kent line from Strood to London Bridge; but when she arrived at Strood she told the guard that she would go on to the Crystal Palace Station, and from thence to London Bridge. After she had taken her ticket from the Crystal Palace station to London Bridge, the inspector of tickets had some difficulty in making her understand that there was still 2s. to pay, as the fare from Strood to the Crystal Palace, and some delay in consequence occurred, which was the ultimate cause of her death.

The up main line platform, at which the London, Chatham, and Dover train had stopped, is situated south of the four lines of railway, and the platform from which all passengers going to London Bridge enter the carriages is north of the four lines of railway, and there is a distance of 112 feet which must be traversed to get from one to the other, crossing on the level four separate lines of railway. As soon as the London, Chatham, and Dover train had left, the passengers going to London Bridge were conducted by two of the Company's servants across the up and down main lines, and afterwards across the up and down branch lines, in the same way and with the same precautions. There is a gate between the main and branch lines, which is kept locked, and the key was in the possession of one of these two men; and the inspector of tickets informed me that after the female passenger, Mrs. Lynch, had paid him the fare