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must have been quite notorious; and therefore there could be but one object in issuing the order I refer to, viz., to screen the Directors and the officers of the Company in the event of a fatal accident occurring from over-driving. Speeds of 40 and 50 miles an hour, with enormous loads, on such inclines as exist between Llanamlet and Landore, must be dangerous, on account of the uncontrollable momentum that would be generated; but that a far higher speed than that contemplated in the order referred to would, I believe, be not only safe, but also necessary to carry on the traffic. If the order of the 17th March had been enforced, the station master was, in my opinion, not only justified, but acted quite properly, in bringing down the train as he did, with a view of passing it along on the up line. And in this he was only following the ordinary practice on all railways when obstructions occur; if it was not to be enforced the distant signal would serve only to deceive, as it did, those entrusted with the conduct of the traffic, and the blame must rest with the management; to which also must be referred the great want of punctuality in the time of all the trains involved in the accident. I cannot express in language too strong the cruelty of exposing the guards of the coal trains to the danger they must run in applying the waggon breaks while the train is in motion; and if a fatal accident should occur to any of them while in the performance of this duty, a serious responsibility must rest with the Directors of the Company.

A deviation of the Swansea Vale Railway, which has been for some time in progress, is now completed, and the level crossing is therefore avoided by that line being passed under the South Wales Railway; but as I feel satisfied that economical arrangements will require the portion of line between Llanamlet and Landore to be worked at speeds higher than ordinary, I would recommend that the traffic between the two stations should be worked by means of the telegraph, and that but one train should be allowed on either line at the same time; and I consider it would be desirable that the telegraph should have the power of communicating something more than "line clear," or "line blocked," as, for instance, "train to proceed with great caution."

At the request of the locomotive superintendent of the Great Western Railway, I append a letter addressed to the public press by the chairman of the South Wales Railway, and a copy of the 23rd Article of the existing agreement between the Great Western and the South Wales Railway Companies; and I give the statement he made to me, viz.:-

"The joint committee have several times acted on the 23rd Article, and directed drivers to be fined and removed, and in all instances their recommendations have been attended to."

The Secretary of the  
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.  
Geo. WYNN,  
Lieut.-Colonel, R.E.

"Article 23. The joint traffic committee may require any engineman or fireman to be removed for inefficiency or other reasonable cause; and if any requisition which may be made for that purpose shall not be complied with by the Great Western Company, the question shall be referred to the determination of the umpire."

#### ACCIDENTS AT STATIONS OR SIDINGS FROM SHUNTING OPERATIONS.

##### BIRKENHEAD, LANCASHIRE, AND CHESHIRE JUNCTION RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, May 27, 1856.

SIR, In compliance with the instructions contained in your letter of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident, that occurred on the 15th instant, near the Frodsham Station of the Birkenhead, Lancashire, and Cheshire Junction Railway.

As a special train, consisting of an engine and tender, five empty carriages, and a van, was passing this station, at a speed of twenty-five miles an hour, at a quarter to four o'clock on the afternoon in question, a youth named Atherton, employed as a porter, and engaged at the time in shunting with a horse, drove a waggon upon the main line. The engine of the train grazed the waggon, and some of the carriages striking it, two of them were thrown off the line. The horse was killed, and Atherton was most severely injured in the arm, thigh, and head.

The guard of the empty carriage train also had a narrow escape, as well as the passengers in another train, which passed the station a few seconds before the accident on the other line of rails, inasmuch as if this passenger train had been a little later it would have come in contact with the empty carriages.

The boy, whom I visited, says that he observed the passenger train approaching from Warrington, and that, when that had passed, he went on with his shunting, not having an idea of the approach of the other train. And here it must be explained, that on account of the curves of the line, the station would have intercepted his view, and prevented him from seeing the empty passenger train until it was close upon him.

The head porter, Bazley, was assisting and superintending Atherton in shunting the waggon, which had to be taken to a siding on the opposite side of the line, to be in readiness for the 5 p.m. goods train from Chester, immediately before the accident; and he states, that, having seen the two trains approaching in opposite directions, he desired Atherton to remain in the siding while he lowered his signals to allow them both to pass. He then went to the other end of the platform to lower his signals, and during his absence the accident occurred.

Bazley brought two witnesses, a joiner and a labourer, who were standing on a bridge over the line, to corroborate his statement, as to his having warned Atherton of the approach of the two trains. But, considering that each of these men, when examined in regard to the details of the occurrence, contradicted him in other respects, and looking to the manner in which Bazley's own evidence was given, it does not appear by any means certain that what he said was true.

It is the custom on this line to attach a red tail-board, or extra red light, to the tail of a preceding train, in order to notify that a special train is about to follow; but it appears that in this particular instance it was not found possible to carry out the regulations in this respect; and these empty carriages having been borrowed from the London and North-western Company, and having been required by them for use on that evening, it was necessary to return them at once. As no telegraphic message was sent to announce its having started from Chester, it was not known at Frodsham that the special train was to be expected.

I understand that the Directors are now providing for a more free use of the telegraph wires, with a view to prevent such an accident in future.

To their not having been used on this occasion, and to a misunderstanding between Bazley and Atherton, or, possibly, to the neglect of the former in not giving proper intimation to the latter before lowering the signals for the passage of the special train, the present catastrophe is to be attributed.

The Secretary of the  
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

I have, &c.  
H. W. TYLER,  
Capt. Royal Engineers.

##### EASTERN COUNTIES RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, April 22, 1856.

SIR, I HAVE the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, that I have inquired into the circumstances connected with a collision that occurred at the Bishopsgate Street Station of the Eastern Counties Railway on the 1st February.

The confined nature of the Bishopsgate Street Station, and the large amount of traffic, render the working of it, both difficult and complicated: to accommodate the traffic, the expedient at all times dangerous is resorted to of converting one of the main lines into a temporary siding; and it was the appropriation of the main line to this purpose that caused the present collision.

About 300 yards from the arrival platform there are two sets of points, on the up line, one a little in advance of the other, from which branches extend to the arrival platform, the lowermost set of points are habitually kept open for up trains, and this branch is known as the main line, the part of the up line which extends beyond these points being called the coal line. The arrival platform is protected by a semaphore signal, and an auxiliary signal, both under the charge of the platform signal man: the auxiliary signal stands close to the points I have before described. The printed rules say that the auxiliary signal is "to protect trains standing beyond the semaphore," this "standing" however is explained to mean, standing at the platform, and extending beyond it.

At about 10.45 p.m. the goods train from Colchester arrived at its usual time, it was allowed to go up the main line towards the platform, which is the usual practice, and which appears to be necessary, in order that it may be shunted to some particular spot for unloading, immediately after the goods train had passed the points, the pointsman turned the Hertford train, which was waiting, through the second set of points, in order that it might reach the platform by that other road, called the coal line, which I have described.

Some short time after the Hertford train had passed, the Woolwich train arrived. The pointsman states that he looked up the main line and saw nothing on it, and as the auxiliary signal showed a white light, all right, he allowed the Woolwich

Accidents appertaining  
to the Management.

Collisions between  
trains following each  
other on the same line  
of rails.

Accidents at stations or  
sidings from shunting  
operations.