

station-master to be consulted, and the telegraph to Grateley set to work, the driver proceeded immediately, and without taking any of the precautions which are usually adopted when a train moves back on the wrong road, of causing the train to be preceded by the guard, to shunt his train back to Grateley, 6½ miles distant. Had he adopted either of the suggestions which were made to him, it is probable that the collision would have been avoided even if he had afterwards gone back towards Grateley. I understand he has been discharged from the Company's service. The guard failed in his duty in not having looked to the state of the whole of the couplings at the front part of the train, and in neglecting to look back after the train started. Before the front part of the train had got 20 yards away from Grateley, the station-master, porter, and the breaksman, all called out as loud as they could, and waved a red light, in order to attract the attention of the driver, fireman, or guard, but without success, and if they had contented themselves with doing their duty, a human life would have been saved, and a good deal of damage to property been avoided. The guard also failed in his duty, in not having prevented the driver from returning back towards Grateley. I am bound however to say that although his conduct proved him to be unfit for the responsible duty of guard, yet he gave his evidence in a truthful manner, apparently with no desire to screen himself from blame. He is an old servant of the Company, and I should hope might still continue to be employed, but in a different and less responsible situation.

It is certain that Mr. Tulk, the station-master, lost his life from an excess of zeal in the performance of his duties, and an absence of discretion. He was

anxious to get this after part of the train away out of the road, so that the next goods train from Exeter might not be delayed on the single line of railway. The Company's regulations do not precisely apply to a case of this kind where the line is single; and it would therefore be advisable to add to them an instruction, prohibiting the after part of a train that had been broken into two parts, from being moved at all from the spot at which it had become separated, whether on a single or double line of railway; or if moved at all in either direction, that it should not be done without sending out a signalman, with fog and other signals, at least ¼ a mile in advance of it. An additional instruction should also be issued sanctioning the regulations adopted on many lines of railway, and partially practised on the London and South Western Railway, of waving a white light from the rear to the front part of a train, after it has got well into motion, so that it may be known if the couplings remain secure. There is no doubt that the after part of the train did, in this instance, move slowly ahead, from the action of gravity, when the engine and front part of the train went ahead, and the exchanges of the signals of the white lights between the breaksman and guard, which has been spoken to, took place when the breaksman found that he was actually moving. He lost sight of the fact, that he must move, when the obstruction in front was withdrawn, in consequence of his train standing on an incline, and probably thought he was being drawn ahead.

I have, &c.,

W. YOLLAND.

Colonel, R.E.

*The Secretary,  
Railway Department,  
Board of Trade.*

## LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, 24th July 1861.*

SIR,

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the London and South Western Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Colonel Yolland, R.E., the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision that occurred, on the 20th ultimo at the junction of the main line of the London and South Western Railway with the Hampton Court Branch near Kingston.

I am, &c.

JAMES BOOTH.

*The Secretary to the  
London and South Western  
Railway Company*

*Railway Department, Board of Trade,  
Whitehall, 18th July 1861.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, in obedience to your minute of the 26th ultimo, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended a collision that occurred on 20th June between a train of empty carriages and a passenger train, at the junction of the Hampton Court Branch with the main line of the London and South Western Railway near Kingston, when one passenger was slightly injured, and the under guard seriously hurt.

The Hampton Court Junction is protected by distant signals in each direction on the main line, and by a standard signal at the junction itself, which applies only to trains travelling up and down the main line. There are also on the branch line a stop signal, placed in the angle between the main and branch lines, 110 yards, a distant signal 560 yards, and an intermediate repeating signal 380 yards from the junction, in consequence of the view of the distant signal from the junction being obstructed. No up

train is permitted by the regulations to pass the stop signal when it is at danger; the site of the signal is 60 yards west from the intersection of the main and branch lines, and it is thus placed that there may be no risk of a train casually running a few yards beyond the signal and thus fouling the main line at the moment when an up main line train is passing. There is an easy gradient on the branch line falling for a short distance towards the junction. I should add that an up branch line train approaching the junction has a good view of the main line west of the junction for a considerable distance.

On the 20th June, one of the days of Hampton Court races, an up special train of empty carriages left Hampton Court for Waterloo Road Station at 2.20 p.m. It consisted of an engine and tender, running with the tender in front, 14 carriages, and two guards' break vans, with one guard next the engine, and another at the tail of the train. The driver's (Charles Campbell) statement of what occurred is as follows:—"In passing Thames Ditton Station, he observed the two Hampton Court distant signals on at danger, and he immediately shut off the steam and opened the steam whistle; that he shut off the steam and sounded the whistle before he got out of the Thames Ditton Station, and was not travelling more than six miles an hour at the time; that when he was within 50 yards of the outside distant signal, both distant and repeating signals were distinctly turned off; that he saw them in the act of being turned off, as distinctly as he then saw me, and that before applying the steam again, he looked in the direction of Esher Station on the main line, to ascertain whether he was duly protected by the main line signals, and to see if he could venture off the branch line." He also stated that "he saw the up distant signal on the main line on at danger, and he turned round towards the direction of the signal box (junction) and saw the standard signal

“also on at danger against the up main line ; that he was outside the branch line distant signal at this time, and he had not then seen the up main line train coming ; that the stop signal was not visible at that point, and that when he saw that all the signals were on against an up main line train, he opened the regulator and proceeded on ; that after he had put the steam on again, he saw a platelayer standing, as near as he could guess, about the repeating signal, and he, the driver, was then between the distant and repeating signals, and the platelayer held out a green flag, standing with his back towards him ; that he had not seen this platelayer before, as he came from Thames Ditton Station to that point, and the red flag lay at the platelayer’s feet ; that the platelayer stood on the up line, and he had to open the whistle to warn him to get out of the way.” He went on to say that “at this time he saw a down branch line train approaching round the curve, and the down train passed the platelayer before he did ; that he passed the down train about the repeating signal, and as the two trains passed, the platelayer only shewed a green flag, and he saw the red flag at his feet ; that while he was going on, as the tail part of the down train passed, it hid the sight of the main line and the stop signal from his view ; that the down train was travelling about eight miles an hour, and after passing the down train he got a distant view of the stop signal, and found that it was on at danger ; that he might be 50 yards from it when he saw it ; that it was not off when he first saw it, but he heard the noise made by the wire in putting the stop signal on before he could see past the down train ; that he looked towards the main line and saw the up train coming, and the standard signal turned off ‘All right,’ for the up main line train to proceed ; that he then, at the moment, saw that he was too close to the junction to stop ; that he was passing the stop signal, and it was on at danger when he passed it, when he was travelling not more than eight miles an hour, and he put on the whole of the steam and put the engine to its full power with a view to pull out of the way of the main line up train ; that his fireman had put the tender break on as they were passing the stop signal, but he told him to take it off again.” He also stated that the breaks had been put on as they were passing Thames Ditton Station, and taken off before they passed the distant signal.”

This statement is corroborated fully by the fireman of this special train, but it is contradicted by the testimony of all the other persons who had any cognizance of the circumstances preceding the accident.

The station master at Thames Ditton informed me, that he saw a platelayer standing between the Hampton Court Junction and the Thames Ditton distant signals, and that he shewed a red flag to the driver of the special train.”

The head guard of the special train says that he rode in the van next to the engine, and when he was near the Thames Ditton down distant signal, he observed the Hampton Court Junction up distant signals on at danger, and the driver whistled for them to be taken off, but not before he had reached the repeating signal ; that he, the guard, had applied his break before the driver whistled ; that he believes the outside distant signal was not taken off ; that the repeating signal was on as they passed it, and that there were three signals on against them as they passed them ; that when he first saw the up standard signal at the junction, it was at all right for the up 11h. 30m. a.m. train to pass ; that he was between the repeating and stop signals, when he first saw the standard signal, and after that it was turned on against the up main line train, and the signalman went into the 6-foot space, and held up both his hands as a signal for the train to stop.”

He also said that “he had not noticed the up distant signal on the main line as he was travelling

“from Thames Ditton Station towards the Junction ; that he had his break on from the outside distant signal until he found that the driver did not stop, but put on full steam to go ahead, and then he took it off ; that he had not noticed any platelayer as they were approaching the Junction ; that the driver whistled for the signals to be taken off, and when he whistled a second time, it was more for the breaks to be taken off than to put them on ; that he thinks they were not travelling more than ten or twelve miles an hour between Thames Ditton and the Junction, and therefore there ought not to have been the slightest difficulty in stopping ;” but he also said that “he does not think he should have seen the signals, if they had been taken off as described by the engine driver, as his attention was given to the approaching main line train which seemed to be coming very slow.”

The platelayer, a brother of the signalman, says he was standing between the Thames Ditton and Hampton Court Junction distant signals when the empty up special train got to Thames Ditton ; that he held out a red flag to it until it passed him, but he does not know that the driver saw him, as he and the fireman were standing on the other side of the engine, looking at a down branch line train which passed at the same spot ; that the guard in the hind break van of the special train stood up at his break, but he cannot say that the break was on as he passed him, but he heard him putting it on after he passed ; that he does not recollect having heard the driver whistle at all, and that he did not see the up main line train until the branch train had passed him.”

The driver of the 1h. 45m. p.m. down branch line train states that “as he approached the Hampton Court Junction he noticed that the up standard signal was on against an up main line train to allow him to cross the junction, and he had passed across the up main line and had got between the stop and the repeating signal on the branch, when he saw the up distant signal was also standing against an up main line train, but he could not see how it stood until he had crossed the up main line, and had got on to the branch.” He also says that “he did not observe how the stop or the other signals on the branch line stood ; that he passed a platelayer before he passed the up special branch line train, and the platelayer was between the outside distant signal and the Thames Ditton distant down signal, but nearer to the latter than to the former ; that he was standing close on the up line when he first saw him, and he was holding red and green flags in his hands ; that he faced him and showed him a green flag with his right hand, showing that it was all right for him to proceed, and he had a red flag in his other hand, held at the height of his hips, with the flag unfurled ; that he passed the platelayer before the empty special train passed him ; that he did not hear any whistle from the special train engine, and that the driver of the special train told him afterwards that he had not seen any platelayer.”

The driver of the 11h. 30m. a.m. up passenger train from Southampton, which came into collision with the special train of empty carriages at the Junction, informed me that “when he was approaching Esher Station on the main line, the Hampton Court distant signal was on against him, and he blew the whistle and it was taken off, and the standard signal was also off ; that he was travelling about 25 miles an hour when he saw the signal taken off ; that he saw a train travelling at a slow pace on the branch line, but could not make out whether the train meant to stop or not ; that he had passed the up main line distant signal (about 600 yards from the Junction) when he saw the branch line train between the stop and repeating signals ; and that he had, in consequence of instructions having been issued to be cautious in passing the Hampton Court Junction, on account of the races, reduced

“ his speed to about 18 or 20 miles an hour; that the  
 “ up main line signal was at all right when he passed  
 “ it, and as soon as he saw the branch line train go  
 “ past the stop signal, he reversed his engine, the  
 “ fireman applied the tender break, and he gave a  
 “ signal to the guard to apply his break; that he  
 “ saw the signalman run across the line and hold up  
 “ both his hands; that he did not see the up standard  
 “ signal turned on to danger after he had passed  
 “ inside the distant signal with his steam shut off;  
 “ that he kept the whistle open until his engine  
 “ struck the next carriage to the last break-van of  
 “ the empty special train coming off the branch line;  
 “ that he thinks he was about 300 yards back from the  
 “ Junction when he took measures to stop his train,  
 “ it might be a little more, and that they ran about  
 “ 70 yards beyond the spot at which the collision  
 “ occurred.”

The guard of this train states “ that just after  
 “ passing Esher Station he saw the Hampton Court  
 “ Junction up main line distant signal at ‘ danger,’  
 “ and his driver sounded the whistle, and it was  
 “ taken off, as well as the up standard signal; that  
 “ they were about 150 to 200 yards outside the dis-  
 “ tant signal when that was done; that on passing the  
 “ distant signal he discovered an up Hampton Court  
 “ train approaching the junction, and apparently  
 “ travelling about 8 miles an hour, so that they  
 “ could have stopped at the stop signal which was on  
 “ against it; that he is not certain whether the dis-  
 “ tant signals were on also, as he could not see them  
 “ so well; that when the Hampton Court train had  
 “ proceeded a little further, it seemed doubtful whether  
 “ it could stop at the signal, and he then put on his  
 “ break, and his driver shut off the steam, sounded  
 “ the whistle for the breaks, and the fireman applied  
 “ the tender break, and the driver then reversed his  
 “ engine; that he observed that the guard at the  
 “ tail of his own train had also observed the danger  
 “ and had also applied his break, and he thinks they  
 “ were not travelling more than 5 miles an hour  
 “ when the collision occurred.”

The signalman at the junction (Charles Carver)  
 states “ that about 25 minutes past 2 o’clock the up  
 “ signals on the Hampton Court branch line were all  
 “ on at danger, and so also were the up distant and up  
 “ standard signal for the main line; that as soon as he  
 “ saw the 11h. 30m. a.m. up train from Southampton  
 “ coming about a mile distant, he altered the up dis-  
 “ tant and up standard signal from ‘ danger’ to ‘ all  
 “ ‘ right’ for the up main line train to pass, that a  
 “ platelayer, with a flag lower down the main line than  
 “ his distant signal, gave him a signal that an up main  
 “ line train was coming; that he did not alter any of  
 “ the signals on the Hampton Court branch line from  
 “ ‘ danger’ to ‘ all right;’ that he heard a branch  
 “ line train coming before he saw the main line train,  
 “ but the main line train first came in sight, and  
 “ when he saw that the branch line train was coming  
 “ faster than it ought to have done past the repeating  
 “ signal, he shoved the main line up distant signal on  
 “ to ‘ danger,’ and the standard signal as well; but  
 “ he does not know whether the up main line train  
 “ had passed the distant signal when he put it on;  
 “ that the driver of the 11h. 30m. train whistled as  
 “ soon as he had put on the up distant signal and  
 “ shut off his steam and tried to stop; that when he

“ first saw the branch line train coming fast he ran  
 “ back and put some dirt on the rails; that the steam  
 “ was on when he first saw the branch line train;  
 “ that it was a very hot day and it is hard to tell  
 “ whether the steam was on or off, but the special train  
 “ appeared to be coming at a regular pace, and when  
 “ the special train came out on to the junction the  
 “ steam was on, but the train was not travelling very  
 “ fast. He also noticed that the breaks were on the  
 “ wheels of the last van after it was knocked off the  
 “ road, but he could not speak to the breaks on the  
 “ leading break-van.”

The under-guard of the empty special train “ saw  
 “ the outside distant signal at danger before he  
 “ reached it, and when he saw the head guard apply  
 “ his break he did the same; but he could not speak  
 “ to the state of the other signals on this branch  
 “ line.”

This collision was evidently occasioned by gross  
 neglect on the part either of the signalman at the  
 junction in improperly altering the branch line sig-  
 nals, or of the driver of the branch line empty special  
 train in disregarding and running past the three sig-  
 nals exhibited to him by the signalman at the junc-  
 tion.

The preponderance of evidence is altogether in  
 favour of the signalman, although it must be ad-  
 mitted to amount almost to an act of madness on the  
 part of an engine driver to run out of a branch line  
 against the signals in broad day light and in clear  
 weather in front of a main line train appointed to  
 travel fast over that part of the line. Still there are  
 many instances of the kind on record, and this looks  
 very like an additional one.

The 11h. 30m. a.m. up train consisted of engine  
 and tender, 9 first, 5 second, and 1 third-class carriage,  
 3 break vans, 3 horse boxes, 3 carriage trucks, and  
 3 waggons, altogether making up 27 vehicles besides  
 the engine and tender. But only 2 guards working  
 2 breaks were sent with this train, a proportion  
 utterly insufficient for a passenger train.

If a larger amount of break-power had been sent  
 with this train it is almost certain that the collision  
 would not have occurred, and great credit is due to  
 the driver of this train for the manner in which he  
 acted, as he was most undoubtedly justified in running  
 at a higher speed, the signals being all right for him  
 to proceed.

It is right also to mention that unusual care  
 appears to have been taken in one other respect  
 towards providing for the safety of the public past  
 the Hampton Court Junction, in consequence of the  
 extra traffic to the Hampton Court races. In addition  
 to the ordinary signals which should and undoubtedly  
 would be sufficient, if properly exhibited by signal-  
 men and strictly attended to by engine drivers, the  
 railway company had stationed platelayers with flags  
 to caution passing trains.

On the other hand, the Company continually run  
 trains with the tender in front of the engine, and  
 they may do so until some accident results from it.

I have, &c.

*The Secretary,  
 Board of Trade,  
 Whitehall.*

*W. YOLLAND,  
 Col. R.E.*

## LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY.

*Railway Department, Board of Trade.*

SIR,

*Whitehall, 2nd August 1861.*

I AM directed by the Lords of the Committee  
 of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to  
 be laid before the Directors of the London and  
 North-western Railway Company, the enclosed copy  
 of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., of his  
 inquiry into the circumstances which attended the

accident that occurred on the 4th ultimo, near the  
 Rugby Station, from the bursting of the boiler of a  
 locomotive engine.

I have, &c.

*The Secretary of the  
 London and North Western  
 Railway Company.*

JAMES BOOTH.