they might have been turning the tap. Now it is
surmised, that in consequence of the lights being put
out in this manner, many of the taps were not turned
off, and as a consequence, the gas pipes would gra-
dually become filled with atmospheric air during the
day; and when the lamps were lit in the evening, this
atmospheric air would have to be gradually ex-
pelled by the pressure of gas; and it might therefore
readily happen, where there were, as in this case, a
large number of lights burning, that a lamp after con-
suming gas for a considerable time, might have atmo-
spheric air driven into the pipe, from some collateral
large number of lights burning, that
the light would go
there has been no trouble in making the gas lamps
nation
explanation how it was that the guard had difficulty
orifice
off,
collision occurred; and I think he
taken steps to stop his train as soon as he
senger
negligence of the driver of the
signal light which would be visible from the same
spot: but I
this statement,· I am
and
as regards
wished them to
thrown away the better.
such wish,
early morning of the 4th September close to Helms-
shore station on the East Lancashire section of the
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, between two
excursion trains, when 10 persons were killed, and
1 has since died of the injuries then received; 4
have had their thighs fractured, 2 have had
both legs, and 12 one leg fractured, 10 have had
ribs or arms fractured, knees or clavicles dislo-
cated, joint ligaments lacerated, or received concus-
sions of the brain, while 49 others have received
bruises and contusions.

Helmshore station is situated seven miles north of
Bury about half-way up an incline of six miles in
length, extending from Ramsbottom to Baxenden,
whence the line falls by a steeper incline (1 in 39)
past Accrington. At Helmshore, there is an incline of
1 in 100 for a length of 150 yards on which the
station stands, but above and below the station, the
incline is one in 78. Forty yards north of the south
end of the incline of one in 100, the railway is crossed
on the level by a public road; and the station build-
ins and platforms are constructed north of this level
crossing.

According to the printed notice of special trains on

LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Sir,

I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of
Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, for the
careful consideration of the directors of the Lancashire
and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy
of the report made by Colonel Yolland, R.E., the
officer appointed by their lordships to inquire into the
circumstances connected with the accident which
occurred at the Helmshore Station, on the 4th Sep-
tember.

I am, &c.

The Secretary to the
Lancashire and Yorkshire,
Railway Company.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Sir,

I have the honor to report for the information of
the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade
that the information with which I am supplied
of the 5th ult., I have inquired into the circumstances
which attended the collision that happened on the

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JAMES BOOTH.
The Secretary to the
Lancashire and Yorkshire,
Railway Company.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,
Whitehall, October 10th, 1860.

I have the honor to report for the information of
the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade
that the information with which I am supplied
of the 5th ult., I have inquired into the circumstances
which attended the collision that happened on the

whilst it stood at danger, or the collision would not
have occurred.

Again, rule 9, page 70, states, "In case of trains on
both lines approaching the point of junction at the
same time, the main line trains are to have the
right of road, and the other trains must be stopped
until such main line trains have passed. If the
other trains have to follow the trains on the main
line, or vice versa past the point of junction, an
interval of five minutes must elapse previous to
their being allowed to do so, and then great caution
and the general regulations as to distance must be
observed." Now, in the teeth of this rule, the up
excursion train was permitted by the signalman at the
junction to follow the up goods train without any
delay. I do not say that the rule is a good one, but
it is to be found in nearly all the books of regulations
that have come before me; and I believe I may say
that it is very generally disobeyed on all railways,
and the interval of five minutes between following trains
at stations and junctions is not preserved.

Again, engine drivers are directed to report any-
thing unusual they may have observed in going along
the line. Now, an engine driver stopped his train
at a signal after the
was turned
off, but that air and not gas was issuing from the
orifice when he first tried to light it.

The collision was evidently occasioned by the gross
negligence of the driver of the 10.15 p.m. down pas-
senger and goods train, in not having immediately
taken steps to stop his train as soon as he ascertained
that there was no signal exhibited at the down dis-
tant signal, especially as he could not see the junction
signal light which would be visible from the same
spot: but I am sorry to be obliged to state that this
accident brings forward additional evidence that there
is great laxity of discipline on the line. In making
this statement, I am assuming, that the directors and
managing officers of the Lancashire and Yorkshire
Railway Company, have in any manner violated any of
regulations, wish them to be observed. If they have no
such wish, the sooner these printed regulations are
thrown away the better.

The company's regulations prescribe that engine
drivers are not to pass danger signals, but to stop; and
as regards distant signals, to draw inside of them
after stopping. The drivers of the up excursion
and down passenger and goods trains both disobeyed
this regulation, as the absence of a light at the
down distant signal must be regarded as tantamount
to the exhibition of a danger signal, and the driver of
the down train also passed the junction signal

M 4
the East Lancashire section of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway dated the 30th August, the Railway Company proposed to run four excursion trains on the 3rd September from Colne; two to Blackpool, one to Liverpool, and one to Manchester (Salford station). The train for Manchester was put on, at the request of Mr. Jennison the proprietor of the Bellevue gardens, near Manchester, and hence it was called the Bellevue train. The notice names 1000 as the probable number of persons who might be expected to travel in this excursion train, and the superintendent of the line (Mr. Shaw) accordingly provided a train of 24 carriages with one engine and two guards, for the accommodation of the passengers he expected for Bellevue. This train, No. 1, was appointed to leave Colne at 9h. 15m. A.M., and to call at all stations between Colne and Ratcliffe bridge to take up passengers. It left at 9h. 45m. A.M. and before its arrival at Burnley, the superintendent at Accrington received the following telegraphic message from the Burnley station-master:—Bellevue train not arrived; 350 passengers here, and great deal at Barracks and many hundreds at Nelson. Send an engine with all carriages you can. On receiving it, the Bellevue trains would consist of 18 carriages which formed No. 2 train. He then received a second message from Burnley before No. 2 train arrived at Accrington and after No. 1 train had come in, to the following effect:—Burnley is clear, but Bellevue train full; Burnley Telegraph has received a message from Brierfield that they cannot be taken on; send carriages. The superintendent, however, subsequently found that the two trains had cleared the line as far as Accrington, where there were 400 passengers booked for Bellevue, and these also were sent on by these trains, which were then quite full. Just before No. 2 train of 18 carriages got away from Accrington, a telegram was received from Haslingdon about 400 passengers booked for Burnley, send plenty of carriages, and the superintendent then made up and despatched a third train from Accrington of 23 carriages, which number was subsequently increased to 31 by the addition of eight carriages at Ramsbottom station. The accident happened to a portion of this train on its return journey from Manchester.

Each train was provided with two guards, and each was assisted up the incline at Accrington by the regular bank engine, but each was taken on to Manchester by one engine. The front engine at Colne ahead of the Bellevue train without mishap of any kind, the last at 1 P.M.

The number of persons who took tickets for the Bellevue train at the various stations was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colne</td>
<td>334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nelson</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brierfield</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnley Barracks</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rose Grove</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hulcoast</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accrington</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baxenden</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haslingden</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmholme</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramsbottom</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radcliffe</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Making up a total of 2453 persons.

In the course of the day, the superintendent arranged with the locomotive superintendent to have two additional engines to assist in taking the three trains back at night; and with the station-master at Manchester, that No. 2 train which had consisted of 18 carriages in the morning, should be reduced to 14 and be taken on by one engine. Thus the first train despatched from Manchester at night, viz.:—at 10h. 45m. P.M., and by the guards written report it appears that only 15 carriages were taken, which is about the maximum load for a passenger engine up the incline. This train arrived safely at Accrington, having left Helmshore at 11h. 57m. P.M.

The next train, No. 2, which was despatched from Manchester, was the last which had arrived there from Accrington in the morning. No alteration was made in the number of the carriages and it left at 11h. 10m. P.M., drawn by two engines, and in charge of two guards, both of considerable experience in working trains up and down the inclines. It was furnished with four second class carriages which had ordinary breaks on them, and the superintendent, in his inspector with No. 3 train, which had had the cotter of a shackle, when the engine started, the tender also broke,—the train was continuously coupled together. It was drawn by two engines as far as Ramsbottom Station, the foot of the long incline; the guards were instructed to have two additional engines to assist in taking the three trains up, and the train was taken off and directed to follow and push on the train from behind,—which direction was obeyed.

Thus it may be asserted that, according to the very general practice which prevails, no excursion trains could have arrived at Manchester without any accident, with the same weight and number of carriages, without anything whatever going wrong; and when they left at night, the superintendent travelled with No. 2, and his inspector with No. 3 train.

As No. 2 train approached Winzer Bridge one mile from Manchester, the signals stood at danger, and the steam of both engines was shut off, and the speed slackened. These guards of course gave rise to some alarm among the passengers. The danger signals had been taken off, the draw bar of one of the carriages came out, owing to the breakage of a cotter, and the hook of a draw-bar of a carriage next to this also broke,—the train could not stop, but the superintendent was only made aware at the time of the breakage of the cotter, and the two carriages were fastened together by the side chains only, the buffers being compressed for the purpose of enabling the carriages to be coupled up tight. The tender was secured to the first carriage by another shackle. When the train reached Ramsbottom Station, the superintendent directed that the passengers should get out of the carriage which had had the cotter of a draw-bar broken, and that the carriage should be taken off. This left the train composed of 30 carriages. One guard, Townshend, rode on the top of a carriage fitted with a break, which carriage was the fourth from the tail of the train—and the other, guard Chipendale's break carriage, was situated about the fifth from the engine. This train is said to have left Ramsbottom at 12h. 16m. A.M., and the guards were aware that No. 3 train was close to them, as they saw it, and knew that it had kept out of the station by the signals, until they left.

No. 2 train stopped next at Helmshore Station at about 12h. 30m. A.M., and as soon as it stopped, the guards say that they got down from the break-carriages to attend to the passengers, and after releasing their breaks in accordance with the ordinary practice. The superintendent states, that after the train came to a stand, he felt a rebound of the carriages, a slight shock, and then he heard something snap. He was in a carriage.
about 10 from the engine, and on looking out, he saw the guard Chippendale who told him that he thought a portion of the train had broken loose, and thereupon he jumped out of the carriage, and to the leading engine, got it detached and started with it, as quick as possible, on the up line, to endeavour to get ahead of the run away carriages, and to turn them off from the down line by a cross-over road, at some distance from the station; that he was not possible, to run forward and give notice to the driver of No. 3 train, that some carriages had run backwards down the incline. But it was too late, the collision had taken place; before the descending carriages were overthrown by this engine.

The guard Tomlinson, who rode on the fourth car­riage from the tail of the train, as already mentioned, informed me that No. 2 train came up to Helmshore 'Stanton very nicely and slowly; that he just allowed the break blocks to rub against the wheels, and that was all; that his break-carriage stopped five or six carriage lengths on the Ramsbottom side of the level crossing—so that three or four carriages would be standing on the incline of one in 75, as the remainder of those which broke away would be on the incline of one in 100. He also stated that, as soon as the train stopped he released his break, and threw the plunger to his side, but was called on the horn by the engine to reverse his engine, while attached to the descending train; that he was very much taken by surprise, and the shock took place. The train, ran to the tender break and applied it, before the inspector who rode on the engine, and whistle for the breaks, and reverse his engine, while attached to the descending train; that he was about to see nothing whatever that appears at all doubtful in the case; that although the steps they were enabled to take were not so good, and exhibited. Another passenger deposed to some person being at the break on the fourth carriage from the tail of the train as it was descending—inasmuch as he spoke to him, but received no answer, just before the collision happened.

According to the written reports made by the guards, No. 2 train left Ramsbottom for Helmshore at 12h. 16m. and No. 3 train at 12h. 21m., exhibiting an interval of time of 12 minutes. The station master at Ramsbottom makes the interval 15 minutes, and the inspector, who rode on the leading engine of the third train, thinks it was 12 or 14 minutes. If that be anything like the interval of time, it is clear that No. 3 train must have travelled much faster up the incline than No. 2, and thus lessened the interval of time.

The effect of the collision on the descending carriages was, I am informed, such, that the first or that at the tail of the train was broken all to pieces; the second was scarcely at all damaged but lying on its side up the slope of the cutting; the third was lying on its side up the slope of the cutting; the fourth had the under frame slightly damaged, —the break blocks on this carriage were fast to the wheels at 9 a.m., and the catch of the ratchet wheel was in; the fifth was on the line, not damaged; the sixth was lying on its side up the slope of the cutting, the seventh was not damaged; the eighth had the panels of the end next Ramsbottom partly pulled out, and the body had shifted on the frame; the ninth and tenth had the under frames slightly damaged, and No. 9, resting on No. 10, the remaining carriages were not damaged.

Of No. 3 train, the leading engine was knocked off the rails, all six wheels, and the trailing wheels also of the engine, and one buffer of the tender were broken. The box front was slightly knocked in, and the right hand clack box on the boiler was knocked off, and the safety valve levers and the spring balances were damaged. The corner of the tank on the tender was knocked off behind, and the tank slightly damaged at the sides. The tops also of two carriages of No. 3 train were knocked off and thrown forward on to the top of the tender, which would render it improbable that the driver of the tender would have found it as it could when it was so suddenly met by the descending carriages; and the inspector informed me, that he did not think the steps they were enabled to take prior to the collision, had at all reduced the speed at which they were going.

I have already stated, generally, the sad results of this accident as regards the loss of life and injuries to persons, and I enclose a list of the sufferers supplied to me by the Railway Company.

I examined the link of the screw coupling, and the bracket and links of two side chains which were shown to me as those that broke on the arrival of the train at Helmshore. The coupling link belonged to an East Lancashire carriage, and the brackets and links which formed parts of two side chains, were attached to and suspended from one end of a Birken­head Railway carriage, one of ten which had been lent to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Com­pany for this occasion. These links are stated to have formed part of the Company's regular stock, and to have been in use for ordinary and excursion trains on the Birken­head Railway. The quality of the iron of the coupling was about 2 of an inch—but that of the iron in the side chains was not so good, and exhibited in the case of the link the appearance of an old fracture, and in the case of the bracket a peculiar character which is not being very recent. It was stated in evidence that the carriages were all examined before they were used for this ex­
cursion train, and also, that all the carriages were properly coupled together with screw couplings and side chains, when the train left Ramsbottom Station.

I should state, as the general result of my inquiry, that it appears the accident was not occasioned by misconduct or neglect on the part of any officer or servant of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company; but that it was the result of an objectionable mode of working excursion trains, not confined to this particular Railway, combined with the absence of certain precautions which should be provided for the safety of the public while travelling over steep inclines. For it is evident:

1. That the accident would not have occurred at all, except for the fracture of the coupling and side chains; and these fractures were the necessary results of making up the train with the large numbers of carriages (30) of which No. 2 excursion train was composed, covering, with the two engines, a length of about 250 yards.

It may be noticed from my statement, that two fractures had taken place while the train was at Worsley Bridge on its way from Manchester; and it has been urged as a means of avoiding this class of accident, that the weight of the leading engine, in this instance, should be considerably increased. I should exceedingly regret to see that course followed, until the proportion of accidents which occur from trains leaving the rails is very largely diminished, as the result of the general adoption of the precaution, so strongly urged, that they could not be broken with a largely increased strain upon them would probably be the sacrifice of a number of lives, which are now preserved, by the breakage of the couplings and the carriages remaining on the rails, or on the top of embankments and viaducts, instead of being dragged down them.

One of the results of making up these monster trains, is that on many parts of such a line as the East Lancashire Railway, where Watton and Manchester the engine driver is unable to see the half of his train behind him, and he therefore would not know, except from the drag on his engine, if one half of it had not broken away. In this very instance, as regards No. 2 train, where the leading engine had been taken at Ramsbottom Station and ordered to push the train up the incline, the consequences of the collision might have been made very much worse, if the driver of the following engine, who could not see what was amiss ahead of him, had not heard the whistle for the breaks from the leading engine, and had not immediately taken steps to pull up. Again, I have seen suggestions thrown out, that the best mode of preventing accidents would be by placing an engine at the tail of trains ascending steep inclines—and the inspector who accompanied No. 3 train, informed me, that one of his reasons for placing the engine at the tail of the train was, that he thought there were eight carriages in rear of the last break in that train, and that those might break away and run back. But the practice of pushing a train, especially a long and heavy train up a steep incline, cannot be too severely censured. It may be done with impunity for a long time, and then some severe accident will prove, that it is not safe to follow a dangerous practice because it has not hitherto led to accident.

The practice of pushing a train up an incline is most objectionable and dangerous, and should be given up.

2. The accident would certainly not have occurred, if the guard Tomkinson, towards the tail of the train had not followed the train, and I believe I may say, the invariable practice of getting down and leaving his break to assist the passengers in and out of the carriages. The man was not to blame, but the practice must be wrong when it can be followed by such lamentable results. No. 2 train was situated on a level it may be safely done; but where it is, as in the instance of Helmshore, on a rising incline, the guard in the break at the tail of the train (for that is its proper position, although it is impossible to induce the managers of certain railways to think so) should never be allowed to quit his break when stopping at the station.

3. The accident would not have occurred if the Helmshore Station had not been situated on an incline which carriages would run downwards by the force of gravitation alone.

4. The accident would in all probability not have happened if these excursion trains had been taken home in five trains of the ordinary size at regular intervals as was formerly the practice of running two very large and one ordinary sized train. This would have entailed very little additional expense to the Railway Company beyond that incurred, as the engines were all available and used with the trains that left. On inquiry I learnt that these excursion trains from Colne to Manchester returned a clear profit after paying all expenses approaching to 250%, and I submit that as this is the case generally throughout the country with regard to excursionists, they are fully entitled, and after all it is decidedly for the true interest of all Railway Companies, that they should be carried in the safest possible manner. The experience of many years will show that this classification is not the only one, and that subject to the precautions for excursion trains than to any other class, and this is the inevitable result of departing from the practice that prevails with ordinary trains, as the excursionists are very generally sent in special trains which are very difficult to manage, and subject to the breakage of the links and breaks to unnecessary and dangerous trains. The accident possibly might have been prevented after the coupling broke, if the train had been supplied with a sufficient amount of break-power. On this section of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway the maximum load for a passenger engine is about 12 or 13 carriages, and an ordinary train of that size is furnished with one guard and an ordinary break at one end, so that Newall's set of three vehicles with breaks on them continuously coupled together and worked by another guard at the other extremity, so that if the same care and precautions had been exercised towards these excursion trains, No. 2 train would have been supplied at least with two sets of Newall's breaks and two ordinary breaks and with four guards.

The officers of the East Lancashire Railway appear to be fully alive to the advantages of providing a large proportionate amount of break-power for excursion trains than to the ordinary trains, and the superintendent was impressed with the necessity of having sets of Newall's breaks for the excursion trains, as he applied for four sets in April, and obtained an order for three sets of these breaks for the very purpose of working these excursion trains, on the ground that he should not like to have to run heavy excursion trains with single breaks as they did last year, (1859). I have already stated that No. 3 train was supplied with one set of Newall's Patent breaks and one ordinary break, but the Superintendent informed me that the four spare sets of Newall's breaks were in store, and had all been apportioned to the four excursion trains from Colne on the 3rd September, so that he had none available, when he had to carry 1,500 more people than he expected. He also told me that he had some months since applied to the Directors to sanction the supply of some additional sets, and the order had been given for their supply, and that they would shortly be available.

In proof of these opinions, I should state that the Railway Company supplied me with a train of 17 carriages, which were more than would ever be allowed to run down the incline, weighted as near as possible the same as on the night of the accident, to experiment with, down the incline from Helmshore Station, and it was conclusively established from the experiments which were made on the 19th, that if the ordinary break, fourth from the tail of the train had been left on, when the train stopped at Helmshore, the carriages would not have started to run down the incline,
when the couplings snapped, as they remained stationary when the engine was uncoupled from them, and it is even very doubtful whether the coupling would have broken at all.

It was also proved that it would take about 2m. 8s. for the carriages to run down from Helmsshore to the spot where the collision took place, when no brake was on, and would take 7m. 25s. if a brake had been fitted with the patent breaks, it is quite possible, that the accident might have been avoided altogether, or that, at all events, the serious results might have been sensibly diminished.

It was also ascertained that the guard Tomlinson might start from the platform, run after the descending carriages and get on the same carriage as his break was on, and put on his break and stop the train in 195 yards, whereas the collision took place at 654 yards, but this was an experiment tried during daylight, when the man knew exactly what he had to do and could see his way, when the rails were dry and in good order, a very different operation to what took place on the night of the accident, when there were a number of people on the platform, the night dark and the rails slippery.

I also tried several other experiments to ascertain in what distance this train could be stopped when the ordinary single break was applied at stated places, but they are not especially pertinent to this inquiry as I have no means of knowing whereabouts the descending carriages were, when Tomlinson put on his break.

This accident is very similar in its nature to one that occurred to an excursion train at Round Oak Station Whitchurch-on-Churn Railway on the 23rd August 1859. In both instances the couplings broke from the rebound of the carriages after the trains stopped and before they attempted to start again; and both the fractures occurred in consequence of too severe a strain being suddenly brought on the couplings of the carriages, by using such heavy trains while they were standing on an incline.

The accident at Round Oak, which was inquired into by Captain Tyler, he saw grounds for blaming the guard. In the present one, I cannot say that I find any. It is true, that in the evidence given before the coroner a witness deposed to his being the person who had solicited, at the door of the carriage, that a collection should be made for him for bringing them safe, but Tomlinson denies that he did anything of the kind, but allows that he was asked by some person at Manchester (Salford Station) to have something to drink, which he declined, but consented to have a meat pie from the refreshment room. There is however no imputation respecting his sobriety, and he is allowed to possess experience in the working of this incline and it is almost certain that he got on the carriage and put on his break. The conduct of the other guard, Chippendale, is more exceptionable, he admits that while the train was standing at Ramsbottom station, same one asked him to have something to drink, and after the train started, he got into the carriage instead of remaining at his break on the top, (a very objectionable situation be it observed) and drank some rum and smoked his pipe, and got out of the compartment time enough to attend to his break in stopping at the Helmsmore Station; but there is nothing to show that this man's acts had any effect whatever in producing the accident.

In conclusion, it may be asked how are such accidents to be avoided in future? The answer is, that they may be avoided in a very simple manner, if Railway Companies can only be induced to work their traffic in a different manner: 1st. By discontinuing the practice of running heavy excursion trains, and by sending excursionists forward in ordinary sized trains. 2nd. By attaching to all trains a larger amount of break power and placing a break van at the tail of every train—and when such trains stop at stations situated on rising inclines, not permitting the guard at the tail of the train to quit his break for the purpose of assisting the passengers.

I trust that this second demand made from time to time by the Board of Trade, on the subject of increasing the amount of break power, on the establishment of a communication between guard and driver, and on the placing of a break at the tail of every train, &c., it remains to be considered whether the inspecting officers, looking solely to the question of the public safety, should not, when inspecting new lines of railway, decline to sanction any stations which are placed upon inclines, on which carriages will travel by the force of gravity alone. Accidents from the breaking away of carriages or the separation of trains into two or more parts are very much more numerous than the public are aware of. Those which are reported to the Board of Trade do not probably amount to one tenth of those that occur, because happily, in the greater portion of cases, they are not attended with serious injury to life or limb. I know, but not officially, of instances where vehicles have broken away, and been caught by sending an engine after them on the same line, only a very short distance in front of a passenger train; and of others where, by the presence of mind of station masters and pointmen, descending wagons have been turned off the main line into a siding and been destroyed. In the course of two years, and in two accidents alone, 25 persons have been killed and 127 injured from the construction of stations on inclines, and I submit, that such a sacrifice of human life, and such an amount of injury to persons, should be held sufficient to justify any inspecting officer in declining to pass a station on an incline on which carriages will descend by the force of gravity. And with their Lordships sanction, I think, that notice should be sent to all Railway Companies engaged in making new lines, if the other inspecting officers agree with this view of the subject, that stations on such inclines could not be passed in future.

I have, &c.

W. YOLLAND,
Colonel R.E.

The Secretary to the Board of Trade,
&c. &c. &c.