DUBLIN, WICKLOW, AND WEXFORD RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade, Whitehall, 19th August 1861.

I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Tyler, R.E., the officer appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred, on the 15th instant, at the Greystones Station of the Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway.

The Secretary of the Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway Company.

Sir,

Wicklow, 14th August 1861.

In compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the accident that occurred on the 15th instant at the Greystones Station of the Dublin, Wicklow, and Wexford Railway.

This station is 17 miles from Dublin, and 5 miles to the south of Bray; and it stands on a gradient falling at the rate of 1 in 50 towards the southward. Besides the single line running past the platform, there is at this station a through siding, connected with it by one pair of points 80 yards south of the platform, and a second pair a similar distance to the north of it, the platform itself being about 100 yards long.

On the morning in question, a short train, consisting of an engine, a third-class break-carriage, and a composite carriage, started from Bray, according to the usual practice, at 8 a.m., to fetch the few passengers who might be desirous of travelling by the 8.40 train from Bray to Dublin via Dundrum, or the 8.50 train via Kingstown.

When this train reached Bray, it stopped at the passenger platform, and the fireman uncoupled the engine from the leading carriage, in order to allow it to drop down towards the south points. As soon as the break was eased off, it ran down slowly to those points, and about six passengers got into the carriages which were left behind at the platform.

After the engine had passed through the south points, a porter from the station unlocked them, according to his practice, and held them over for it to run back into the siding, that it might proceed along the siding towards the north points, and thus get upon the main line and join the other end of the train.

It had already begun to move back along the siding towards the north points, and the porter had got upon the footstep, for the purpose of accompanying it to those points, when the driver suddenly perceived that the carriages were running down upon and were within a few yards of him. He had neither time to proceed far enough to the northward to prevent them from fouling him at the points, nor time to get back out of their way; and a slight collision ensued, which threw the leading wheels of the break-carriage off the rails, broke its buffer planks, and knocked off two of the buffer-heads between the carriages.

Only one of the passengers, who jumped out of the carriage in a state of alarm, appears to have been injured; but if the carriages had not thus struck the engine, they would have run for a considerable distance towards Wicklow before being brought to a stand.

The staff at the station consisted of a station-master and two porters. The station-master saw the carriages running down towards the points from the window of the booking office, but was too late to do any good by the time he came out on the platform; one of the porters was, as I have stated, attending to the siding points; and the other porter was engaged in loading goods in the goods-yard on the north of the station.

A porter from Bray had been sent in the break-carriage, to act as guard to the train; and if he had applied his break, as was his duty, when he arrived at Greystones, the accident would not have occurred, but he fell asleep after leaving Bray, and was only awake by the shock of the collision. He makes for himself is that he had been at a “wake” at the house of a friend, and had had no sleep for the two previous nights.

To prevent a similar accident from occurring in future, it will be desirable to provide that the guard shall always uncouple the engine from the train instead of the fireman; and it will be better to keep the carriages away from the platform, and thus to prevent the passengers from taking their seats, until after the engine has run round them, and been attached to the north end of them, in readiness for the return journey towards Wicklow.

One of the pistons of the engine was found to be fractured after the accident, but this, of course had no effect in producing it.

I am, &c.,

H. W. Tyler,
Capt. R. E.

The Secretary,
Board of Trade,
Whitehall.

HAMPSTEAD JUNCTION RAILWAY.

Railway Department, Board of Trade, Whitehall, 24th October, 1861.

I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you for the careful consideration of the Directors of the London and North-Western Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Colonel Yolland, R.E., the officer appointed by my Lords to inquire into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the Hampstead Junction Railway on the 2d ultimo.

I am, &c.,

J. Booth.

The Secretary to the London and North-Western Railway Company.

[Similar letter sent to the Secretary to the North London Railway Company.]
Sir,

Northam, near Bideford,
9th October, 1861.

I HAVE the honour to report the information of the Lords of the Privy Council for Trade, in obedience to your instructions of the 5th ultimo, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the dreadful accident that occurred on the evening of the 5th September, on the Hampstead Junction Railway, close to the Kentish Town station, from a collision between an up-exursion train returning from Kew to Bow, and a down-train of empty ballast waggons, in the act of coming to a junction with the up-line, on which it stood (after being drawn out of a siding in course of construction) to the down line, when the engine of the excursion train was thrown off the rails and dragged six of the carriages after it, and then separated from the carriages, and ran down the embankment on the left side, and fell over on to its side, while the de-railed carriages followed, and three of them were precipitated over the wing-wall of an under bridge, while the mean't that should have been adopted, which resulted in the death of the persons working the train while coming from the canri~es, and ran down the embankment to the down line, when the engine of the ballast train had got clew of the up-line, and distant signal or in any other way which necessitates the use of ballast trains is in hand,—but as Willesden junction the coal trains brought up by the third or goods line of the London and North-Western Railway for the Western line, or for the Southern line, are all crossed over the London and North-Western main lines by means of the Hampstead Junction Railway.

The circumstances attending this dreadful accident were very carefully investigated before one of the coroners for the county of Middlesex (Mr. Humphreys) on three separate days, and I attended at this investigation, which resulted in a verdict of manslaughter against one of the signalmen; and from the information then obtained, and from previous and subsequent inquiries, I shall endeavour to show the causes which produced this calamity, and state the measures that should be adopted, and to endeavour to prevent a repetition of similar accidents in future.

In the progress of the investigation it soon became apparent that the accident might have been occasioned by defective regulations as to the mode of working the traffic generally, by the absence of the precautions usually adopted, or possibly by a combination of specific acts of neglect on the part of the persons working the trains or in charge of the stations, in the following way:—

1st. From neglect on the part of the servants of the company with the ballast train in coming out of the siding without permission from the signalman at the Kentish Town station, as no signalman had been taken by the signalman to protect the ballast train while in the act of shutting from the siding to the down line.

2nd. From neglect on the part of the driver of the excursion train (Scot), not keeping a good look out, and in disregarding any danger signals exhibited from the Kentish Town station.

3d. From neglect on the part of the signalman at the Kentish Town station (Raynor), in having failed to protect the ballast train while coming out of the siding, by not exhibiting danger signals on the station and distant signals, or in having taken them off before the ballast train had got clear of the up-line.

In the absence of the precautions which preceded the accident it is necessary that I should explain certain facts which are not to be found in connection with most accidents that occur on railways.

The Hampstead Junction Railway is a double line of railway, about five miles in length, which joins at its western extremity the North and South-Western Junction Railway, and at its eastern extremity the North London Railway at the Kentish Town junction, situated between Kentish Town station on the Hampstead Junction line, and Camden Road station on the North London Railway.

The Hampstead Junction Railway is leased to the London and North-Western Railway Company, which appoints all the masters, pointmen, porters and platelayers, and are responsible for the working of the line; but the locomotive power, carriages, engine drivers, firemen and guards are supplied by the North London Railway Company, who get one-third of the receipts arising from the passenger traffic for this service.

The arrangement of the trains and time bills is also left in the hands of the executive of the North London Railway Company; but the running of the North London trains on the Hampstead Junction Railway is guided by the regulations of the London and North-Western Railway, and not by their own.

The only trains which use this line throughout the week return passenger trains, except when ballasting or any other work which necessitates the use of ballast trains is in hand,—but as Willesden junction the coal trains brought up by the third or goods line of the London and North-Western Railway for the Western line, or for the Southern line, are all crossed over the London and North-Western main lines by means of the Hampstead Junction Railway.

The Kentish Town station, which is 8½ miles distant from Kew, is situated on a curve of 30 chains radius, and on an incline of 1 in 101·6 for a length of 45 chains, which incline changes at the station to an incline of 1 in 109 for a length of 64 chains, falling all the way from close to Hampstead Heath station to near to the Kentish Town junction. It is properly protected by semaphore station signals, and by distant signals on each side, all worked from the up platform. The up distant signal between Hampstead Heath (the next station to the west) distant about 5·6ths of a mile, and Kentish Town stations, is 473 yards from the platform, and this up signal is exhibited on the same post, but on the opposite side, as the down distant signal is exhibited from the Hampstead Heath station, from whence there is lit, for the night signals by one of the porters from Hampstead Heath station. The Kentish Town station down distant signal is 447 yards east from the platform, and is situated close to a compound carrying the railway which at this part is on an embankment of about 29 feet in height, over an occupation road;—the actual spot where the carriages fell over, and also close to a three-throat set of back points, of which one set leads out of the up main line to intended large coal sidings, a second to the main line, and the third to a cross-over road leading to the down line. There is also another cross-over road a short distance nearer to the Kentish Town junction.

These intermediate coal lines have been constructed for many months past by the London and North-Western Railway Company, and material has been brought up in ballast waggons from the vicinity of Dushey, by that Company's third or goods line of rails, which joins the Hampstead Heath Railway at Willesden, and these ballast waggons are permitted by the signalman at the Willesden junction to go forward between the various passenger trains when the signal is clear.

The traffic on the Hampstead Junction and North London Railways between Bow and Willesden junction is worked with the aid of the electric telegraph, but under the different regulations of the two companies, and information is provided at each station for the up and down lines, in addition to a talking instrument; and the traffic
over the Hampstead Junction Railway is so worked that no train is permitted to pass a station without being retarded by the semaphore signals and the driver cautioned by the signalman, unless an intimation has been received by the signalman through the telegraph from the station in front of the train, that there is no train or siding in the station. As a matter of fact, this regulation exists with reference to the ballast trains carrying material for the formation of the sidings at Kentish Town.

On the North and South-Western Junction Railway, being a branch of the London and North-Western Railway, a train was due to leave Kentish Town at 7 a.m. for Willesden without the knowledge and sanction of the station-master or his representative.

The operation of carrying materials by the ballast wagons into the sidings in course of construction, or of bringing the empty wagons out of the sidings on to the up line, and thence by one of the cross-over roads to the down line, had, up to the time of the accident, been carried on, and protected by placing the telegraph instruments all at "danger," while the ballast wagons were in the act of entering or leaving the siding, or while they were standing on either the up or down main lines adjacent to the siding on the up or down station, prior to starting in either direction.

These precautions would be sufficient for the protection of the ballast train on the up line from another up train (supposing all the company's servants performing the duty in the proper manner), if the practice adopted in connexion with the working by telegraph were to stop all trains at a station when the line had not been telegraphed clear from the station in front, according to the practice followed on the North and South-Western Railway, the instrument in charge of men, employed on the operation of the material to be carried in by the platform, and the down train on the right at "danger," to cover the passage of up and down trains which had just quitted the station. Before I proceed to detail the circumstances that occurred immediately preceding the accident, I must state that the train leading into the siding was standing on the up or down line, and he could not see a train in that position until he was nearly abreast of the station platform; and he must run some distance beyond the platform before he could see whether it was standing on the up or down line; and further, the absence of any red flag or red light and the presence of a white light at that spot on a train would be strong evidence that it was a down train on the down line, as an empty ballast train proceeding westwards would have no business standing there, unless it was covered by the station and distant signals.

About 5.50 p.m., a ballast train, consisting of engine and tender, and ten ballast wagons, was seen by the signalman at Kentish Town station from Bushy, and when the train had been placed in the siding, which as already stated is entered close to the under-bridge, and while the men were engaged in emptying the wagons, the driver of the engine, at Kentish Town station, received a signal from the North London Railway for water, and left again, he says, at 7.3 p.m., and returned to the siding at Kentish Town station, and entered it at 7.9 p.m.

The engine was then attached to the break van at the tail of the ballast wagons, and the driver, after the 6.35 p.m. up regular train had passed towards Kentish Town junction, says, that he sounded the engine whistle to get permission from the signalman on duty at the Kentish Town station (Raynor) for the ballast train to be allowed to come out on to the up line, and he asserts that he did not bring his train out of the siding until he had got that permission, by seeing the signalman wave his hand, and noticing that the up main signal was distant. He then looked at the distant signal close to the points leading into the siding, were both at danger, the up-distant signal could not be seen from this spot.

After bringing the ballast train out of the siding, and leaving it standing on the up line, the engine and tender were detached, and the railway Crossing officer, by the cross-over road nearest to the Kentish Town junction, on to the down line, the guard of the ballast train holding the points for the engine to cross over, and from there to the other end of the track again to the up line, but at the other end of the ballast train, the flagman with the ballast train holding the points. The engine was then metaphorically raised on the up line, and the ballast train was then passed, after which the engine was lowered on the down line, and then worked to the sidings of the North London Railway.
attached to the ballast train, and the driver stated that he at once proceeded to put his engine in motion, the flagman again holding the pawl, so as to take the train by the cross-over road, (over which the engine had just passed, in the opposite direction,) from the up to the down line, and thence away along the down line past the Kentish Town station. The fireman and engine-,man, thinking that a second signal was needed, and with a view to confirm the statement of the driver, that the ballast train was not brought out of the siding until the signalman, Raynor, had given permission, by waving his hand, nor until the up main signal and the down distant signal were both put into daylight position, the ballast train did not see the permission given by the signalman Raynor, but noticed that the signals had been placed at danger before they moved out of the siding. The signalman Raynor when before the coroner could not remember having given permission to the ballast train to come out of the siding, but on the other hand he maintained that all the signals at the station were up at danger, and not taken off, after the 6.35 p.m. regular up train had left. None of the men on the ballast train could speak to the state of the signals at the time the excursion train passed the Kentish Town station platform. According to the driver and guard of the ballast train, after the guard had left, and not before the Kentish Town up distant signal had actually started, and was still standing on the up line, an up excursion train was seen to be approaching with the steam full on, and travelling at the rate of 40 miles an hour, as it passed the station platform, and on seeing the train, the driver with apparent diminution of speed, until it had got to within 50 or 60 yards of the ballast train, and immediately after the tank engine of the excursion train struck the second truck of the ballast train, as the driver, when he saw the excursion train, put his train in motion, towards it, in the endeavour to get his own train out of the way, by taking it along the cross-over road leading to the down line, and he had only succeeded in getting his engine, tender, and one truck clear of the train by the time the excursion train was in motion, which struck the ballast train. The engine driver and fireman of the ballast train assert that the engine whistle was sounded immediately the excursion train came in eight, and that the whistle continued up to the time of the collision; so says likewise the guard and engine-man, that the fireman saw the red side light of the engine towards the excursion train, while the guard showed a red light with his hand lamp. I should not, however, omit to state that none of the services with the North London Railway Company with the ballast train were cognizant of any excursion trains running on the Hampstead Junction Railway at the time, as the 6.35 up train did not carry any tallyboard denoting that a special train was to follow it, in accordance with the instructions and signals given to the regular train followed on the London and North-Western Railway. With respect to this excursion train, it appears that there were five excursion trains from the North London Railway for Kew on the 21st of September, principally composed of persons in the employ of that company, and their relatives and acquaintances, and the special notices issued from the office of the Secretary and General Manager of the North London Railway (Mr. Chubb,) directed that these excursion trains should return direct to Kew. The ballast train and stationmaster at Kew put some of the excursionists into the regular empty carriages, and the regular empty train to follow that one was appointed to leave at 7.35 p.m. Finding that the Kew station was throned after the 6.35 p.m. train had left, and having an empty train to follow, the engine-driver and fireman continued in accordance with the discretionary power entrusted to him, upon starting the first of the return excursion trains at 7 p.m. instead of at 8 p.m., or 25 minutes after the regular 6.55 p.m. up train had left, an interval much too long to allow of the regular train getting past Willesden junction and under the double protection, if it may be so called, of the telegraphic and out-of-door system of signals. This excursion train contained of a tank 1 and 12 vehicles, of which the one next to the engine was a guard's break van, continuously coupled by Chambers' patent continuous breaks to the two next vehicles behind it, a first and a second class carriage, and a baggage coach, the men employed on the North London Railway riding in the break van, but there was no second guard with this train, nor any break at the tail of the train. After this train reached Willesden junction it was regularly telegraphed for that station to order the Edgware Road station to let some of the excursionists get out, and might have been stopped at any other station by the usual out-of-door signals, if there had been any occasion to delay the train, assuming that the driver of the excursion train did not disregard the out-of-door signals.

The regular 6.35 p.m. up train passed the Hampstead Heath station at 7.2, and it arrived at the Kentish Town station at from 3 to 5 minutes after, and after stopping for about a minute, proceeded on its way, and reached the Camden Road station at 7.6 according to the platform foreman, having been signalled forward from the Kentish Town junction at 7.4, and this time was recorded in the book which appeared to have been kept at any of the stations concerned. The excursion train stopped about 3 minutes at the Edgware Road station, and as soon as it had left, it was telegraphed forward to Finchley Junction, and from there to Hampstead Heath station, which was passed somewhere between 7.12 and 7.16, the signalman having duly received the telegraphic signal "line clear" from Kentish Town station after the 6.35 train had passed, or the excursion train would not have been permitted according to the regulations to pass Hampstead Heath station without being cautioned. The regular signalman (Lessey) at the Kentish Town station was limited to have been on the platform and the station, after the 6.35 train left, and he stated that he did not give the telegraphic signal "line clear" so Hampstead Heath station when that train was gone, but he did telegraph forward to Kentish Town junction "train on line"; neither at the time, he left had any permission been asked by the ballast train to be allowed to come out of the siding, and no telegraphic message had been received from Hampstead Heath station that another train was on the line.

He also stated on the line from Finchley Junction, "When the ballast train wants to come out, see that all the four danger signals are up;" and that it had not been the practice to block the line by telegraph while shunting was going on at the siding, unless the weather was very favourable, and the present operation by placing the four signals at danger.

The first portion of the line between Hampstead Heath and Kentish Town stations is on a level for a short distance, and after that, there is the continuous incline to near the Kentish Town junction; and the driver of the excursion train, Scott, (who was swept off his engine and carried down the embankment on the right-hand side in the midst of the broken ballast trucks, when the collision occurred, and had his arm and broken an arm, and broken a leg,) when the fireman went down the left side of the embankment with the engine and fell under it, and died some days after of the injuries he received,) states that he shut off the steam of the locomotive, he got off the fireman, and before he got to the Kentish Town up distant signal (which can be seen for 630 yards before it is reached), and that he found both the up distant and up station signals at Kentish Town station at "all right" for him to pass the station; that he sound the whistle before coming to the platform, and just as he got through the station, he saw the ballast engine standing on the curve and not in motion, but he did not know whether it was on the up or down- line; that there was no signal at all, nor red light on the ballast train, and that when he
first saw it he told his fireman to put on his break as tight as possible, and he did so when about half way between the platform and the spot where the accident occurred; that he did not know at the time whether the ballast train was on the up or down line, and he, the driver, opened his whistle at the same time that the fireman put the break on, because he did not know that the ballast train was doing there; that the ballast train began to move just as he whistled, and that he was about 15 or 20 yards off the ballast train when he saw that the engine wason the crossing; that the ballast engine had one white light, a head light, and a very weak head light, and that the collision took place immediately afterwards, when he was running 15 or 16 miles an hour. He also states that he did not hear any whistle from the ballast engine, until he put on the break, and then he heard a couple of little sharp whistles. He estimates that he was running 20 miles an hour, when he passed the platform, having slackened speed in running down the incline, and he thinks the driver, except as to the speed at which he had ample time to get out of the way if he had reversed his engine and pushed the ballast train down the incline in the same direction that he was going, at the moment when his train (the excursion) first came round the bend of the Kentish town, Brydges, who had his arm broken and received a severe concussion, was in the break-van that ran over the wing wall of the under bridge and fell down into the road below, and of which the body and carriage were afterwards removed. He also states that he saw the London and North London signalmen were riding in the van with him, and they looked out, and he was about to pass between them, when they said, "All right, Joe," and he looked out on the other side, but saw no red light at which he thinks the train had passed, that the train had passed, that the train was on the wrong road, of the North London signalmen were riding in the van with him, and they looked out, and he was about to pass between them, when they said, "All right, Joe," and he looked out on the other side, but saw no red light at which he thinks the train had passed, that the train had passed, that the train was on the wrong road, and he heard a whistle, but does not know which engine whistled, and his break was put on simultaneously with the whistling. The guard's evidence was entirely confirmatory of that given by the driver, except as to the speed at which they passed the Kentish Town station, which he estimated at 35 miles an hour, a far more probable rate of speed than 20 miles an hour, and more in accordance with all the other evidence given on that head.

One James Cox, who was looking in the guard's break van, who was very much injured, and who has since died, stated that he noticed the Kentish Town station signal, and that it stood at "all right," that as the train was passing the Kentish Town station he was looking out of the break window, standing on tiptoe, and had his head out of the front of the break, and that the guard had gone to the other door; that he had no particular reason for looking out, but he did so to see if all things were right; that the steam was off at the time, as the guard had just before mentioned: "We are off to Camden Town now without steam;" that he saw the danger before they came to the spot, as he saw the trucks, and that the driver of the excursion train whistled, and he sang out to the driver to put on the break, also that he saw one red light all the way, and that was pulled off when they whistled for it. The other signalman, Woodley, who was also seriously hurt, only saw one red light on the journal, and he thought the train was off when the whistle was sounded for it, but his evidence was not otherwise of much importance, and in his very weak state he evidently did not like being questioned. It will be noticed that the statements of the men working the ballast train do not accord well with that of those travelling in the excursion train as to the fact of red lights having been exhibited on the ballast train. The signalman at the Kentish Town station, Raynor, who was retained before the inquest, could not remember many of the essential facts which would have thrown further light on this melancholy accident; and he would not admit that he had performed any acts that authorized the ballast train to come out of the siding, or rather, if the signalman Fossey be correct, to allow the ballast engine which was on the down line when Fossey left the station after the 6.35 up train had quitted it, to cross on to the up line and then to proceed after hooking on to the ballast wagons to come out of the siding on to the up line, and then to proceed to shunt and get away; but on the night of the 2d September, on which the accident occurred, he made a statement which was taken down, which is one of the officials of the London and North-Western Railway, and he corrected it on the following day. It is to the following effect:—

"A ballast train was in the siding, and when the up passenger train due here at 6:07 p.m. had passed, the engine drew the ballast wagons out of the siding on to the up main line, and then the engine ran round to the rear of the train for the purpose of starting back to go home. All the signals, both up and down, were on at danger since the half past 6 p.m. down train, which did not arrive here till near 7; and the 6.57 p.m. up train, which arrived about 5 minutes past 7, had passed. The ballast engine then was ready to start with the ballast train over the crossing on the up line. Just at this moment I received a telegraph signal from Hampstead that an up train was on the line, and I went outside and took off my main and auxiliary signals, thus clearing the line, and at the auxiliary while it was on at danger, but on observing that the ballast train was still on the up line, I put the signals on again immediately. I do not think a second elapsed in taking them off and putting them on again, and the engine of the passenger train was about two or three yards from the main signal when I put it on again. The passenger train came through the station at a very high speed. I cannot say whether my up auxiliary signal was lighted or not, as the porter at Hampstead Heath always lights it; but I, myself, lighted all the others."

I had a notice of excursion trains that were to leave Kew between 8 and half past 9 p.m., but I had no notice of this train, which arrived here about a quarter past 7, being three quarters of an hour before the time specified for the first of these trains to Kew. I also beg to state that I did not see any flagman belonging to the ballast train signalling between me and the train."

"3d September 1861." He admitted that the coroner that he had received the telegraphic message from Hampstead Heath station of the excursion train being on the line, and that he acknowledged it, and also that he had telegraphed to the Kentish Town junction, when the excursion train passed, "Train on line," and it was proved that such a message was received at the junction, and replied to, but Raynor did not admit getting the reply. The collision appears to have occurred about 7.16 or 7.18 p.m., 10 or 12 minutes after the 6h. 35m. up train had passed. Such are the principal statements on which an opinion must be formed as to the actual cause of the accident, and I have had no difficulty whatever in arriving at the conclusion that it was directly caused by the neglect of the signalman Raynor in taking off the up-distant and up-main signals before the excursion train came in sight, and while the ballast train was in the act of shunting from the siding to the down line. I do not think it was "clearly proved" that the London and North-Western Railway Company's servants with the ballast train had received permission from Raynor to come out of the siding, but think it probable, that as they were not aware that any change had been made in the time of starting the
first return excursion train, they left the siding after seeing the 6h. 35m. p.m. up train go by without any tail boards, on observing that the station and distant signal was at "danger," without having obtained such permission, but on the other hand it does not appear that Raynor made any objection to their coming out of the siding, or he would have shown them a red flag, and stopped their coming on.

To prevent similar accidents in future I would recommend,

1st, that the telegraphic system of signalling should be extended on to Kew, and that the regulation of not waiting a train to pass a station until the telegraphic signal "Line clear" had been received from the station in front, as followed on the North London Railway, be adopted in preference to the practice on the London and North-Western Railway, which in my opinion is not sufficient under all circumstances to prevent a collision from taking place.

2d, that more experienced signalmen than Raynor should be employed. The safety of the public should not be entrusted to a lad of 19 years of age, paid at the rate of 14s. or 15s. a week.

3d, that the construction of such a siding as that near Kentish Town station should, like the connection with billiard pits, be protected by station and distant signals on each side, with a signalman to attend to the signals.

4th, that no excursion or special train should be permitted to run at any other than the appointed time, without a special notice tail-board or extra lamp being sent by the previous regular train, according to the practice followed on the London and North-Western Railway.

5th, this excursion train should have had another guard with a set of continuous breaks at the tail of this train. If the driver of the excursion train is correct in saying that he sounded the whistle for the breaks when he was half-way between the platform and the spot where the collision occurred, a distance of 447 yards, the application of the breaks on three more vehicles at the tail of the train might have greatly mitigated the effects, even if it did not prevent this accident. In addition I should observe that as there are heavy rising inclines between Kew and Bow, in 80 and 1 in 95, the absence of a break at the tail of the train, might, in the event of the train breaking into two parts, have been attended with serious consequences. Before Chambers' continuous breaks were introduced on the North London Railway, two break vans and two guards would have been sent with such a train. The value of these breaks is fully admitted by the executive of the North London Railway, and there are no peculiar difficulties in their application to excursion trains on this line, as they are not liable to be broken up and detached at intermediate stations; but they undoubtedly involve a little more labour in making up the trains in the first instance, and the only objection urged against their use on this train by the Locomotive Superintendent (Mr. Adams), was that he did not like two sets of breaks, as they might not work together, and that practically speaking he thought 3 for 12 vehicles, besides the break on the tank engine, was sufficient. I do not think the objection has any weight, as no two different breaks ever do set together, and it is of no importance that they should do so; and as regards the second, I must maintain, that the larger the proportion of break power that can be attached to a train, the greater will be the chances of safety to all persons in the train when some unforeseen neglect of duty on the part of an individual, like that at Kentish Town station, suddenly occurs.

I have, &c.,

W. YOLLAND,

Colonel, R. E.

The Secretary to the Board of Trade,

Whitehall.

Railway Department Board of Trade,

Whitehall, 13th December 1861.

I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by Captain Rich, R.E., of his inquiry into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred on the 25th Oct. near the Eastwood station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

I am, &c.,

JAN. BOOHE.

The Secretary of the

Lancashire and Yorkshire

Railway Company.

Railway Department, Board of Trade,

Whitehall, 3d December 1861.

In accordance with your minute of the 18th ultimo, I have the honor to report, for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred on the 25th October between an East Lancashire express passenger train from Bradford to Blackpool and a quick London goods train near the Eastwood station of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway.

No passengers were injured, but the head guard of the goods train received some contusions, from which he appears to have recovered. His break van, and the last goods wagon but one, were knocked off the line; the break van being the only one injured.

The quick London goods train from Normanton, composed of an engine, tender, 26 waggons, and two break vans, was late in leaving that station. It arrived at Hebden Bridge station about 4.47 p.m., and left about 4.55 p.m. on the day in question to proceed westward to Todmorton.

The East Lancashire express train was due at Hebden Bridge about 5:5 p.m. It passed that station without stopping at 5:5 p.m., travelling at a speed of 50 miles per hour, according to the evidence of the station master.

This express train travels on the same line as the goods train as far as Todmorton junction, which is 4½ miles from Hebden Bridge. The express train consisted of an engine and tender, a break van, and two passenger carriages, fitted with continuous breaks, coupled in the order given.

The foreman of porters at Hebden Bridge station states, that he told the engine driver of the goods train, whilst the latter was taking in water, "to be "quick and get away, as a fast train would be up "shortly." The engine driver denies this.

The signal man at Hebden Bridge states, that he told the head guard of the goods train, as the latter was leaving, "to make haste, as the express train "was due in ten minutes." The guard denies this.

A signal was given to either trains at Hebden Bridge. The regulations of the Company provide that the danger signal shall be kept on 5 minutes after a train passes; the caution signal 5 minutes more. The period between the passing of the trains...