

In the second place was the mistake made by both the station porter and booking clerk in overlooking the fact of the passenger train ceasing to stop at Blue Pits. They are of course both to blame for not having made themselves acquainted with this change, which they had ample opportunity of doing from the bills which had been posted three days previously; but I blame still more the station master for not having drawn the attention of his staff to such an important change in the running of this train.

The method adopted, both before and since the fire at the signal cabin, of announcing to the junction signalman the fact and not the time of trains leaving Todmorden is very likely to be delusive, as in the

event of the telegraphic message being delayed in transit the signalman would conclude he had more time at his disposal for shunting than would be really the case. The telegraphic information should go direct or complete into the signalman's cabin to be of a really reliable value.

It may be remarked in conclusion that under a good system of block telegraph working this collision would, in all probability, not have occurred.

I have, &c.

C. S. HUTCHINSON,  
Lieut.-Col., R.E.

The Secretary  
(Railway Department),  
Board of Trade.

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade  
(Railway Department),  
26th October 1871.

Sir,

In compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 6th inst., I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the collision which occurred on the 3rd instant at the Victoria station, Manchester, on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, between an engine and a passenger train to which it was about to be attached.

Three passengers are returned as having been shaken.

In this case a train for Bury, due out of Victoria station at 10.6 a.m., was waiting in one of the docks ready to start as soon as the engine, which was bringing in another train from Bury, should be attached to it. The train consisted of five vehicles and a van, all coupled with continuous breaks, which were on to hold the train, as the rails of the dock have an inclination downwards from the buffer stops of 1 in 150; the van being about 10 yards from these buffer stops.

The driver of the engine to be attached to this train had been accustomed to drive in and out of Manchester for the past six years, and had driven this engine, which was stated to be in good working order in all respects, about six months. He had arrived tender first with a train from Bury near the foot of the Victoria incline at about 10.8, five minutes

late, where, at a point about 270 yards from the front of the train to which he was to be attached, after having almost or very nearly stopped, his engine was, according to custom, detached by the guard from the train, which latter would, when the engine was far enough ahead, be broken down the remaining portion of the incline of 1 in 59 by the guard, having thereby gained sufficient impetus to ascend that of 1 in 150 leading to the platform. After being detached from the train, the break was eased off, and the engine having attained by gravity a speed of three or four miles an hour, the break was again applied at a point about 120 yards from the front of the train for Bury. The driver and fireman were then engaged in putting down sand to help them in the journey out, as the rails were greasy, and their attention was thus diverted from the train, and the driver only perceived just in time to reverse and put on contrary steam that the tender breaks alone, which were hard on, would not stop the engine. The collision then occurred at a very low speed without doing any damage either to the engine, tender, or carriages; the latter were knocked back about 2 to 3 yards.

The collision must be ascribed to a want of due care on the part of the engine driver in joining the train he was about to take to Bury.

I have, &c.,

C. S. HUTCHINSON  
Lieut.-Col. R.E.

The Secretary,  
(Railway Department),  
Board of Trade.

## LANCASHIRE AND YORKSHIRE RAILWAY.

Railway Department,  
Board of Trade,  
26th October 1871.

Sir,

In compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 9th inst., I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances attending the accident which occurred on the 4th inst. at Chorley junction on the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway, from the engine and part of a coal train leaving the rails.

The fireman had both his legs cut off, and died about eight hours after the accident.

At Chorley junction, 200 yards on the Preston side of Chorley station signals, the Lancashire Union line

to Blackburn leaves the main line of the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway from Wigan to Preston. The junction is provided with a proper locking apparatus, the signals at the junction and station (by a slot arrangement) being mutually controlled.

There is a slight fall in the line from the station to the junction, soon after passing which the Blackburn line rises on a gradient of 1 in 60.

The permanent way is of a substantial character, consisting of steel rails weighing 70 lbs. per yard, fixed in chairs, at average central intervals of 2 ft. 8 in. weighing 42 lbs. each. At the time of the accident some new sidings were being put in on the station side of the junction, in carrying out which arrangement the ballast had been removed from the main line close up to the junction points.