as this train was entering the station. The signalman at Aldersgate Street is said to have acknowledged the telegraphic signal, and Lamin says that he then lowered the up starting signal placed at the east end of the Farrington Street station, thus giving permission for the Hammersmith train to proceed on to Aldersgate Street station.

Lamin then gave "line clear" back to Granville box, and then received four beats on the bell from Granville box, to denote an up Great Northern train proceeding to Ludgate Hill station; he acknowledged this signal, and then lowered the up distant stop-up branch line station signal (the lower of the two arms) to allow the Great Northern up train to enter the branch line station. Lamin says that he then put on the starting signal at the east end of the Farrington Street station to danger. The Great Northern train is said to have arrived at 9.37 a.m., and to have left at 9.39 a.m., and as soon as it arrived Lamin states that he gave back line clear to Granville box, having previously, as soon as that train reached the station, put on the up distant signal, shifted the facing points so that they stood right for the main line, and also replaced the lower arm of the station signal at danger.

Lamin also states that, when the up Hammersmith train arrived, he could not, in consequence of the denseness of the fog and the frost on the windows of the signal box, see whether that train carried any tall light; he could see lights in the carriages as the train passed the Granville box, but could not see the up platform or the train standing alongside as it stopped. And he adds, that when he took off the starting signal for the Hammersmith train to proceed to Aldersgate Street, he could not at that time see the up platform or the standing train on account of the fog.

As soon as line clear had been telegraphed back to Granville box, after the Great Northern train had arrived at both of them, Lamkin, the signalman at Granville box telegraphed by one beat of the bell an up Metropolitan train, and Lamkin acknowledged that signal and lowered the up distant and up station signal for the train to enter the main line station, thinking that the Hammersmith up train had gone on to Aldersgate Street station; and at 9.39 a.m., the Metropolitan up train consisting of an engine and five carriages, which should have left Bishop's Road station at 9.50 a.m., but did not leave until 9.12 a.m., arrived, and ran into the Hammersmith up train which was still standing alongside of the up platform, and which had not moved since it arrived there, at a speed estimated at from five to seven miles an hour.

But little damage was done to the rolling stock, and no vehicles were thrown off the rails, as the incoming train was in the act of drawing up in order to stop at the station when the collision occurred, and this was fortunate, as the fog was so dense that the tail light on the Hammersmith train could not be seen at a greater distance than about 20 yards.

The evidence is very conflicting as to whether the signalman Lamkin did or did not take off the starting signal for the Hammersmith train to proceed to Aldersgate Street station as he states.

The driver and fireman of the Hammersmith train engine, which stood almost immediately under the starting signal, asserts that the signal was at danger when they arrived, and that it was not taken off before the collision occurred. The guard and broken-down of the train, and one of the porters at Farrington Street station agree in saying that it certainly was not taken off, after the passengers had got out of, and into the train, after arriving at the station, which operation might have occupied a minute, but that it was possible that it might have been done while they were attending to the passengers. On the other hand, Lamkin the signalman, and three men in the employ of Messrs. Spiers and Pond, the contractors for the supply of refreshments at the station, who were waiting on the down platform to cross the line as soon as the train had left, speak to the starting signal having been lowered and raised again to danger. The fact is not very material, except as showing the manner in which the collision was occasioned, because there can be no doubt that the collision was due to the signalman Lamkin's carelessness in having taken off the up distant and up station signals, when, by his own statement, he could not see whether the Hammersmith up train still stood alongside the platform; and when under such circumstances he did not ascertain the fact before he lowered these signals.

The general manager, Mr. Fenton, had some months since called the attention of the signalman to the necessity of looking to see if the tail lights were burning at the rear of each train. And on this occasion, in consequence of the denseness of the fog, an extra man was employed to signal trains, and stationed between the distant and station signals.

I have, &c.

W. YOLLAND, W. H. EBEBT, 5th February, 1867.

The Secretary. Board of Trade, Railway Department.

NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE RAILWAY.

Board of Trade (Railway Department), Whitehall, 18th February 1867.

Sir, I am directed by the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade to transmit to you, to be laid before the Directors of the North Staffordshire Railway Company, the enclosed copy of the report made by the Right Hon. R.C., the official appointed by their Lordships to inquire into the circumstances connected with the collision which occurred at North Rode junction on the North Staffordshire Railway on the 25th ultimo.

I have, &c.

R. G. W. HERBERT.

The Secretary of the North Staffordshire Railway Company.

Board of Trade, 13th February 1867.

Sir, In compliance with the instructions contained in your minute of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report for the information of the Lords of the Committee of Privy Council for Trade, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances which attended the collision that occurred at North Rode junction on the North Staffordshire Railway on the 25th January last.

Six passengers are reported to have received cuts and bruises at North Rode station. A large number of passengers were reported to have escaped the collision without injury.

The Railway to Derby branches from the Railway to Stoke at this point. Both are double lines, and there is a loop siding on the east side of the Railway to Derby, and another loop siding on the west side of the Railway to Stoke, close to the junction.

The points and signals controlling the junction are on the shadowing principle, and are worked by a man in an elevated box; but the loop sidings, and the points connecting them to the main lines, are in charge of a ground pointman, who is stationed in a hut below close to where the two railways meet.

On the 26th of January two waggons were placed
in the loop on the west side of the railway to Stoke, to be taken on by the goods train that was timed to leave Froghall at 4.15 p.m., and proceed, via North Rode junction, to Stoke and Colwich.

This goods train, which consisted of an engine and tender, 20 waggons loaded with minerals, one loaded with goods, and a guard's van, arrived at North Rode junction about 5.40 p.m. It was dark at the time. The driver backed his train on to the down line from Stoke. The breakman of the mineral train uncoupled his van and then gave the signal for the driver to pull up the remainder of the train, so as to back it into the siding. The ground pointman held the points of the siding for the driver to back in, and the breakman gave the driver the signal to stop, with his hand lamp, when he thought that he had backed the waggons sufficiently far into the siding. He then unhooked the engine, so that the driver might fetch the break van which had been left on the down line, bring it into the siding, and place it at the end of the train ready to go to Stoke. The driver had brought the break van into the siding, and the breakman was in the act of attaching it to the mineral train, when the passenger train that is timed to leave Macclesfield at 5.30 p.m. and North Rode junction at 5.40 pm. passed through North Rode junction on its way to Stoke. It was about 10 minutes late.

The passenger train consisted of an engine and tender, one second class, two composite carriages, and a guard's van. It passed through North Rode junction at a speed of about 15 miles per hour, and had attained a speed of about 20 miles per hour when it reached the south end of the loop siding and came into collision with four waggons that had got out of the loop siding on to the main up line. Two of the waggons were knocked off the rails and were smashed, the two others were driven forward along the up rails. The front wheels of the engine were knocked off the rails, the passenger carriage next to the engine and the third passenger carriage from the engine, and guard's van, were also knocked off the rails, but none of them were upset.

The line and siding fall towards Stoke on a gradient of 1 in 176; there is a chock block at the lower end of the siding, and the ground pointman should have put this chock block on, when the two waggons were put into the siding to wait for the mineral train going to Stoke. It appears, however, that the ground pointman neglected this duty, and consequently when the mineral train was backed into the siding it pushed the waggons that were standing in the siding on to the main line, and at the same time two of the mineral waggons became unhooked by striking the waggons that were standing in the siding, and then followed them down the gradient of 1 in 176 on to the main up line, where the engine of the passenger train came in contact with them.

The guard or breakman of the mineral train is to blame in not having gone to the south end of the siding to look after the waggons that were in the siding previous to allowing his train to be backed in.

The ground pointman was guilty of gross neglect of duty, and had been committed to prison as he could not pay the fine inflicted on him, and I did not see him. The breakman had paid the fine of 10l. which the magistrate decreed.

Since the accident the Company have put in a blind siding at the south end of the loop, with the points so arranged that waggons will run into the blind siding, unless the points are held over to let them out on to the main line.

The collision at Wigan, a short time since, proves that a similar accident may occur on a dark night, when the waggons have to be pushed up an incline by the waggons put into the siding at the opposite end. It appears, therefore, desirable that all mineral sidings, where they join main lines, should be protected by blind sidings, with points loaded so as to remain open for the blind siding; and that by constant watchfulness and supervision the men in charge should be found out, when they neglect the duties entrusted to them.

I have, &c.

The Secretary of the Board of Trade,

Capt. R.E.,

Railway Department,

F. H. Rich,

and Major.