LONDON AND SOUTH-WESTERN AND MIDLAND (SOMERSET AND DORSET) JOINT RAILWAY.

Board of Trade, (Railway Department.)
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,
8th August, 1894.

Sir,

I have the honour to report for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the Order of the 13th ultimo, the result of my enquiry into the collision that occurred on the 10th July at Templecombe on the South-Western and Midland Railway Companies' Somerset and Dorset Joint Line.

On this occasion, a Midland Company's return excursion train from Bournemouth to Worcester, which left Bournemouth at 9.4 p.m. and was travelling on the Somerset and Dorset main line, and a Somerset and Dorset goods train, which was proceeding from the upper to the lower goods yard at Templecombe, approached Templecombe No. 2 Junction on converging lines and came into collision at the fouling point of the two lines opposite to No. 2 signal-box.

The passenger train was a heavy one and consisted of 15 vehicles belonging to the Midland Railway Company marshalled in the following order from the front; van, third-class Pullman car, seven third-class saloons, bogie composite carriage, two third-class bogie carriages, two thirds, and a van, and it was fitted throughout with the automatic vacuum-brake. It was drawn by two six-wheeled coupled tender engines belonging to the Somerset and Dorset Joint Line, both of which were fitted with steam-brakes working blocks on all the wheels of the engines and tenders, and with the vacuum-brake apparatus for actuating the automatic vacuum-brakes on the train, both the steam and vacuum brakes being simultaneously applied by the movement of one handle. Both engines were running chimney in front.

The goods train consisted of a six-wheeled coupled tender engine, similar in all respects to the two engines on the excursion train, and 14 goods vehicles, including a brake-van, the latter being the fourth vehicle from the engine, which was running tender first.

The collision was fortunately unattended by any serious consequences to the passengers, only six of whom are reported to have complained, the injuries in all cases being slight, but the damage to rolling stock and permanent way was considerable. The Pullman car, seven saloons, and a brake-van belonging to the Midland excursion train were much knocked about. The engine of the goods train, 10 wagons (four of which belonged to the Somerset and Dorset Joint Line and six to private traders), and the goods brake-van were also damaged, one of the trucks being blown down the embankment.

Both the up and down lines of rails of the Somerset and Dorset Railway were pulled out of shape for a length of about 150 yards, and a considerable number of sleepers and chairs destroyed.

For details of damage to rolling stock and permanent way, see Appendix.

The positions of the vehicles composing the two trains after they came to a stand is shown on Plate No. 2, from which it will be seen that the trains were locked together, and moved forward along the centre of the embankment, the rails of the up and down roads being drawn inwards towards the six-foot way. It is a very fortunate circumstance that the vehicles took this direction, and that only one truck was blown down the slope of the embankment. Had the passenger train been forced over the edge of the embankment, the results would doubtless have been disastrous.

Description.

This collision occurred opposite to Templecombe No. 2 signal-box, at the junction between the Somerset and Dorset main line and the branch line known as the "upper road" from Templecombe (L.S.W.) station. The Somerset and Dorset line from the south is single as far as this junction, where it becomes double. The line from the South-Western station is double from the junction up to the station, where it terminates, so far as passenger traffic is concerned, in a single platform line, which is used for both the arrival and departure of passenger trains.

The Somerset and Dorset line approaches the junction from the south on a rising gradient of 1 in 100, and the line from the station approaches the junction on a falling gradient of 1 in 100. The line beyond the junction is carried on an embankment 18 feet high, and there is a bridge under the line close to the point of collision.
The junction up home-signal (No. 4) for the Somerset and Dorset line is situated in the fork between this line and the line from the station at a distance of 105 yards from the signal-box, and 120 yards from the point where the two trains first came into collision. The post carrying this signal also carries a stop-signal (No. 23) for trains travelling on the down line of the upper road towards the station. The junction up home-signal No. 2 for the upper road is carried on a post on the left-hand side of the line to which it refers, and is 65 yards from the signal-box, and 82 yards from the point of collision. This post also carries on a bracket a "Calling on" signal (No. 5) to enable trains to draw up to the signal-box when the home-signal is at danger. There is an up starting-signal (No. 9) in advance of the junction on the left-hand side of the up (S. and D.) line. The up distant-signals (Nos. 3 and 1) for the Somerset and Dorset and station lines are situated 800 yards and 448 yards from their respective home-signals.

About 770 yards north of No. 2 signal-box on the Somerset and Dorset double line there is another signal-box called No. 3, which protects the junction between the main line and the goods lines leading to Templecombe lower goods yard, and which is provided with distant, home, and starting-signals in the usual manner. The distant-signal for No. 3 box being carried on the same post as the down junction signals of No. 2 box.

I attach a plan of the site; (Plate No. 1,) on which are indicated the lines and signals referred to in this report.

There is a good view of the up distant-signal for the driver approaching Templecombe No. 2 box from the direction of Wimborne, and the junction home-signal for this line is visible from a distance of 501 yards. The up junction home-signal for the "upper road" from Templecombe is visible from a distance of about 478 yards, and the up distant-signal can be seen about 100 yards off, but it is not visible from the platform of the South-Western station. There is a good view from the junction home-signals of the starting-signal in advance of the junction, and also of the signals belonging to No. 3 signal-box.

The Somerset and Dorset single line from Wimborne to the junction at Templecombe is worked on the train tablet system, and the double line from the junction towards Bath and the double line from the station are worked on the absolute block system. On the Somerset and Dorset line, whether single or double, the rules in force permit of the use of the "Section clear but junction or station blocked" signal, by which trains are allowed to approach the junction simultaneously from different directions so long as the lines on which they are travelling are clear up to the home-signals, and after the drivers have been stopped and warned by the signalman at the boxes next to the junction box that they are to proceed cautiously. The actual wording of the rule is as follows:

"18.—Section clear and station or junction blocked.—When the line is clear to the home-signal, and it is necessary for a train to be allowed to approach a post cautiously, in consequence of an obstruction existing ahead of the home-signal, or from any other cause, the 'Is line clear?' signals must not be acknowledged in accordance with clause 3, but the signal Section clear and station or junction blocked (13 beats on the bell) must be given, and when this signal has been acknowledged the needle must be pegged to Train on line. The signalman receiving such signal must stop the approaching train, and instruct the driver to proceed cautiously to the post from which the signal was received. When some time is likely to elapse before the train for which the 'Is line clear?' signals have been sent, will be ready to enter the section, the Section clear and station or junction blocked signal must not be acknowledged, but when the train is ready to enter the section, and before it is allowed to do so, the 'Is line clear?' signals must be again sent so as to give the signalman at the post in advance an opportunity of receiving the train under clause 8, if the circumstances are so altered as to admit of his doing so."

On the line from the station to the junction this signal is not in use, for the reason that the upper signal-box at Templecombe station belongs to the London and South-Western Railway, and this Company do not make use of the "Section clear and station or junction blocked" signal on any part of their system. There is a special block telegraph code between the station (London and South-Western) signal-box and No. 2 (Somerset and Dorset) box at the junction, and there is nothing in the rules to prohibit the signalman at No. 2 box from permitting the signalman at the upper box to despatch a train from the upper station while the junction is blocked, the semaphore signal being in this case relied upon to protect the junction, and the driver receiving no caution on starting that the junction is blocked.
Evidence.

Henry Parke, driver, stated: I have been in the service 15 years, and a driver 18 months. On the 10th July I came on duty at 5.30 a.m., and signed off duty at 11.30 a.m. I then worked the return excursion train due at Bath at 11.30 p.m. On the previous day I was off duty all day. I came on duty on the morning of the 10th July, in the first instance, to work the 6.0 o'clock goods from Bath to Templecombe, but was afterwards ordered to couple to the excursion train. I started back from Templecombe at 8.45 p.m. I was four minutes late starting. I had tender engine No. 46, with six-wheeled coupled and six-wheeled tender, but it was fitted with steam-brake on the engine, and also with an apparatus for working the automatic vacuum-brake on the train. My engine was leading, there being two engines on the train. The single line is worked by tablet system, and the first engine carries the tablet. I had 15 vehicles on my train equal to 17; they were all fitted with the vacuum-brake. The brake connections were properly made through the train before leaving Bournemouth. I tested the brake at seven places before leaving Bournemouth. The leading engine, on testing the brake, would test it right through the train, and on the second engine also. I did not stop at Templecombe; we ran through. On approaching the up distant signal at Templecombe I found it at danger. I whistled, shut off steam, and applied the brake. The signal was not lowered before I passed it. When I came in sight of the junction signal it was off. I then released the brake. I did not put steam on again, but allowed the train to run on towards the junction. I passed under the bridge before sighting the home signal. On approaching the junction we were running as fast as 8 to 10 miles per hour. I did not apply steam before reaching the home signal. My fireman got the tablet ready and gave it up to the signalman at the signal-box. At that time I did not see the goods train approaching. After giving up the tablet I did not see the goods train at all until this collision occurred. Just after the fireman gave up the tablet I felt the vacuum-brake go on. My fireman said, "Someone has run into us." There was no time to do anything. As soon as we stopped I got off my engine, took a lamp, and went back and found several coaches off the line. My engine did not leave the road. Some one asked what was the cause of the accident, and he said, "That Bridgewater man has run past the signals." I said, "My signals were all off," and he said "Yes." The starting signal ahead of No. 2 box was also lowered for me, and the distant, home, and starting signals from No. 3 box were also off. I could see all signals clearly. I have been running over the line many years, also years as fireman and 18 months as driver. On coming around the curve approaching Templecombe from Bournemouth the signal appears to change sides with the upper road signal. We know our signal, it is much higher. I have also been in the habit of driving trains from the upper road. The signal slightly change position in going round the curve on the upper road, but one is higher than the other. I cannot account for the other driver running past the signals. I noticed his signals; they were at danger. In looking at my own signals I could see his on the brake as we passed and I was quite sure my signal was down. The back lights of the down signals are not likely to be mistaken for the up home signals. I have never had any doubt as to the signals.

Frederick Elford, driver, stated: I have been 17 years in the service, seven years as a driver. I drive both goods and passenger trains. I came on duty on July 10th at Bath at 5.30 a.m. and booked off at Bournemouth at 11.30 a.m. I came on duty again at 7.00 p.m. and was due to book off at about 12.30 midnight. I was delayed by the collision. My hours of duty on the previous day were from 6.30 a.m. to 9.00 a.m. on the Bath pilot engine only, and I was off duty again from 9.00 a.m. to 3.30 p.m. On the following morning my engine was a tender engine, six-wheeled coupled and six-wheeled tender fitted with the steam-brake, and working also the automatic brake, one handle works the two brakes. Both engines were running chimney first. Mine was the second engine of the train. It left Bournemouth at 8.30 a.m. The vacuum-brake was in working order, as I had tested it; I used it on stopping at Blandford for water, it was working all right. On approaching Templecombe No. 2 junction the distant signal was against us; I shut off steam and the leading driver applied the brake as is customary; the speed of the train was slackened. On passing through the bridge I saw the home signal; it was off. The brake was released; neither my self nor the leading driver gave our engines steam. On passing the junction home signal my attention was directed to the signals in advance; they were off. The train slackened speed until the tablet was given up, but before leaving Bournemouth. I did not see any train on the upper road. I was looking over the right-hand side of the engine when my mate drew my attention. He said, "When mate when," rather sharply. I applied the brake and opened the whistle. I did not see the other train. I applied the brake myself. I am not quite sure how many yards we stopped in. We were not running at more than 9 or 10 miles an hour when my mate called out. After I had stopped I went back to the signal-box and gave the passengers a light, they were trying to get out of the carriage. I went on and passed the passengers. There were several coaches off the road; I could not say exactly how the vehicles were. The vehicle next my engine was off the road; it was a brake-van. The train had separated between the van and the Pullman car by about six or eight yards. I spoke to the signalman. He said that the man on the Bridgewater train had run into mine; he said his name was "West," and that he had run past the signals. I did not speak to "West." The same two engines worked the passengers forward to their destination some two hours later.

Tom Henry West, driver, stated: I have been 17 or 18 years in the service, and driving about 10 years. On the 10th July I came on duty at Bridgewater at 6.10 p.m., having booked off duty at 9.55 a.m. in the morning. I work a train from Bridgewater to Templecombe, and thence to Bath. I was due to book off at Bath at about 5.45 a.m. I am stationed at Bath. In consequence of the accident I booked off duty and waited at Templecombe. I booked off at 7.30 a.m. The previous day I signed on at 8.25 p.m. at Bath, and worked until 9.35 a.m., when I booked off at Bridgewater. I came on again at 6.10 p.m., and was due to book off at about 5.45 a.m. I arrived at Templecombe upper station on July 10th at 8.30 p.m. with a goods train. My engine was detached from the train and then attached to some empty waggons which were in the siding, and these were placed next to the van by coming down the outside road and setting back to the van on the platform line. The van was between three loaded wagons and two empties, the three loaded wagons were behind the van, and the empties, and then waited some time for the van to be worked to be finished, that is the mixed goods being transferred and reloaded. The guard gave me the signal to start away to the lower yard at about 10.10 p.m. by my watch; the guard, however, booked 10.11 p.m. At that time the engine was long on the engine first and went back tender first, the starting signal was off; I did not whistle; the starting signal had been off for some minutes. I could not see the distant for No. 2 box from the platform. After I started I saw that No. 2 distant was on the
home-signal was at danger when I saw it first. The home-signals for the upper and lower roads are one on the one side and the other on the other side. I should be on the left-hand side. The up starting-signal was off, and the home-signal of No. 3 box was also off. I could not say how No. 3 distant-signal was. At any rate my home-signal was at danger. I drew down the incline. I was looking over the side of my engine on the signal side; I looked past the side of the tender and thought I saw my ball. I am not clear as to which signal it was that I saw. It was a very dark night. I think I must have taken the starting-signal for my home-signal and not have noticed my home. I had to see two signals, namely, the home and starting signals, and only saw one. I took the home-signal for the other. It was all done in a few seconds. I have a home-signal and a starting-signal to obey, and I must have taken the starting-signal for my home-signal. I cannot account for seeing only one green light. I think I took the up starting-signal for my home-signal and cannot account for it, and am very sorry; I do not complain of any signals. I knew that there was a train due about this time from Bournemouth; I did not know whether it had run through or not. I do not get any warning if the junction is blocked from the signalman in the upper signal-box, but run down under cover of the signals. I think I had too many signals being missed for all right signals. On approaching the home-signal I heard the special coming, and having just looked past the tender knew it was not a down train. I rushed to the other side and saw that the home-signal for the Bournemouth train was off; I reversed my engine, put the steam-brake on and did all I could, but before I could come to a standstill the Pullman car struck the engine and pulled us together. I had no time to whistle for the brake. I had no help from the guard, and have not spoken to him about the affair. After the collision I went to the signalman and asked him if he had reversed my signal, and he said "No," and I came to the conclusion that I had mistaken the signal. After the collision my engine was not off the road. It was on the up line from Templecombe, and the side of the first saloon was resting on the footplate. The Pullman car was against the end of the tender. When I first saw the Bournemouth train I was travelling about six miles per hour. I had no steam on. The engine was fitted with the vacuum and steam brake apparatus, both worked by one handle; the steam-brake acted on all wheels both of the engine and the tender.

Charles Leous, fireman, stated: I have been in the service about six years, and fireman about three years. I have the same hours of duty as my driver. I had not been with driver West for some time. I started with him on the Monday night. On the night of July 10th I arrived at Templecombe at about 9 p.m. We disposed of part of the train, having left three waggons on the platform line. We then attached some empty waggons, ran round and set back against the van and three waggons on the platform line. After cutting them, we waited about 40 minutes. The starting-signal was lowered before we started away. The guard gave the signal to start. I said "Right away" to the driver. I did not see the position of No. 2 distant-signal. I looked behind and attended to the fire. I did not see anything in front past the distant. I saw the signal of No. 2, the waggons up and saw the home-signal, worked from No. 2 box, was off for the Bournemouth train. I did not see my own home-signal. As soon as I saw the Bournemouth train I jumped for the brake, and said, "Mate, here's another train alongside of us. We tried all we could to stop the engine was reversed and the brake screwed on, and we were not able to do anything more until we collided. We were going at about five or six miles per hour, and had no steam on. I jumped out onto the bank; the driver did not jump. I saw the signals in advance after the collision, and they were all off. I did not look at my own home-signal beforehand, but saw that after the collision it was at danger. I had no conversation with the signalman.

Water Henry Perry, signalman, stated: I am a signalman stationed at Templecombe No. 2 Junction. I have been in the service 14 years, 103 years as signalman, and four years and nine months at Templecombe No. 2 box. My hours of duty are 10 per day. I came on duty on July 10th at 8 p.m. and remained until 6 a.m. The following morning, I have the single line tablet code to work to, also double line block between Nos. 2 and 3 boxes, and special L & S. W. code between No. 2 and upper. I have a caution signal as to two trains approaching the junction, that is, from Stalbridge or from No. 3 box. The times in my book for the Bridgwater train on the down journey (or its way to the upper station) are, arrived 9.36, left 9.38, stopped for line clear. After finishing its work at the upper station this train was warned back from the upper station on the up line at 10.4 p.m. I did not lower the signals for it, it was to come down to my home-signal. I did not lower any signals for the train after acknowledging the warning signal. The Bournemouth special was offered me at 9.59 from Stalbridge, that is, when it should have left Sturminster Newton. I see it after I had set the road to run through. I accepted at 9.59. The next signal I received was the departure signal from Stalbridge at 10.6. I acknowledged the warning signal for the goods from the upper station at 10.4 and the departure signal for the same at 10.1.1, this is the last I should hear of the train from the upper station until it came in sight. I sat the road for the Bournemouth special, but did not lower the signals; then I asked "Line clear" to No. 3; it was accepted at once. I did not pull the signals until the train was in sight. I expect the signals against the train to check the tablet. There are no instructions to do this; it is our own working. After offering the train to No. 3 junction I did not lower the signals until it came in sight. It had passed the distant-signal when I sighted it, and when I did so I lowered my home and starting signals. I lowered my signals about 10.10 or 10.11. I did not receive the departure signal for the goods from the upper station until after I had lowered my signals for the Bournemouth special. After the goods train had been warned I could not stop it, as I have no instructions to block back to the upper station. You wished to verify against the accident that occurred?—Yes. You say you held back the Bournemouth train with that view?—Yes. You held it back for two purposes, to make sure that the goods would stop and also to get ready for the tablet?—Yes. Why did you lower the distant-signal for the Bournemouth special?—I did not lower any of the signals, waiting to see how the trains were coming. Why did you lower the distant-signal for the Bournemouth train? Was it because you had accepted the train from the upper station, and you wanted it to come to a stand before the Bournemouth train passed the junction?—Yes. What regulation is there that gives you permission to hold back the train until you leave the upper station? After you have told the signalman at the upper station that the previous train has passed your box, may he let another train come without obtaining any permission from you?—Yes. After I see the tail lamp I should give the three beeps, and the goods would until I locked up and saw the home-signal, worked from No. 2 box, was off for the Bournemouth train. I did not see my own home-signal. As soon as I saw the Bournemouth train I jumped for the brake, and said, "Mate, here's another train alongside of us. We tried all we could to stop the engine was reversed and the brake screwed on, and we were not able to do anything more until we collided. We were going at about five or six miles per hour, and had no steam on. I jumped out onto the bank; the driver did not jump.
The following are the facts which led up to this collision, the consequences of which, though it was fortunately unattended by any personal injuries, might have been serious.

A goods train from Bridgwater arrived at Templecombe (London and South-Western) station, on July 10th at 9.50 a.m., and after doing some work in the upper goods yard was ready to start, at about 10.4 p.m., back to the lower goods yard with 10 empty wagons, a brake-van, and 3 loaded wagons, the 3 loaded wagons being next the engine, and the brake-van between them and the empties. The engine, which was running chimney in front on its arrival, had its tender first for the short return journey as far as the lower yard.

At 10.4 p.m. the signalman in the London and South-Western Railway upper box gave what is called the "Warning" or "Train coming" signal for this train to signalman Perry in Templecombe No. 2 junction box. Perry did not lower his signals for the train, as he intended it to stop at the junction home-signal (No. 2). At 9.59 p.m. signalman Perry received from Stalbridge the "Warning signal" for the return Midland excursion train from Bournemouth to Worcester, and immediately afterwards he received the "Train tablet" signal from Stalbridge, which he at once acknowledged, thereby enabling the man at Stalbridge to withdraw the tablet from his apparatus for the excursion train. At 10.6 p.m. Perry received the "Departure" signal from Stalbridge, indicating that the excursion train was then leaving that station, and he then set the road for it and gave the "Is line clear" signal to Templecombe No. 3 box, which was at once accepted. (It may be remarked here that ordinary block working is in force between Templecombe boxes Nos. 2 and 3, as the line between them is double, whereas train tablet working is in force between Stalbridge and Templecombe No. 2 boxes, the line between these places being single). Having had the excursion train accepted by Templecombe No. 3, Perry was at liberty to lower his signals for the excursion train, but he states that he did not do so until the train came in sight, and he accounts for his action in this respect by saying that as he had received the "Warning" signal for the goods train from the London and South-Western upper box at 10.4 p.m., and he was momentarily expecting to hear that their train had left the upper station, he wished to make quite sure that it had come to a standstill at the junction home-signal (No. 2) before allowing the Bournemouth excursion to pass the junction. When the excursion train came in sight
Perry lowered the home and starting signals (Nos. 4 and 9), but there was no necessity to lower the distant-signal as the train was already past it. Immediately after lowering the signals, i.e., at 10.11 p.m., Perry received the “Departure” signal from the upper (London and South-Western) station box for the goods train. The distance from the London and South-Western station to the junction is 772 yards on a falling gradient of 1 in 100, and the distance from the over-bridge, which the excursion train was passing when the signals were lowered for it up to the junction, is 506 yards on a rising gradient of 1 in 100. There were two engines on the excursion train, which was a heavy one, and the drivers had checked the speed of the train when they found the distant-signal against them, but they left the bridge first and then the home and starting signal off the brake was released, and the engines passed over the junction at 10.12 p.m., the speed being about 10 miles an hour according to the driver’s estimate, the leading engine giving up the tablet as they passed the signal-box to signalman Perry, who came down to receive it. In the meantime driver West started away with his goods train from the upper station at 10.11 p.m., his engine running, as already stated, tender first. The platform starting-signal was lowered for him by the signalman in the upper box, but when he sighted the junction distant-signal (No. 1) and the junction signal (No. 2), which are worked from No. 2 junction box, they were both at danger, the distance between these signals being 448 yards. It was, therefore, driver West’s duty to have stopped at the junction signal. He asserts he prepared to do, but on looking up again he saw, according to his statement, what he thought was the junction signal off for him, and he therefore allowed his train to run down to the junction, thinking that he had a clear road to No. 3 box, where he was to be shunted into the lower goods yard. Driver West’s engine reached the junction fouling point at the same moment as the excursion train, and struck the Pullman car, which was next to the leading van. The two trains became locked together, and ran forward along the centre of the embankment, the up and down lines being pulled inwards for about 120 yards before they came to a standstill. The relative position of the two trains after the collision is shown on Plate No. 2. Neither of the drivers of the passenger train appeared to have seen the goods train till the moment of the collision, but driver West of the goods train heard the excursion train approaching just before the collision, and realising what was about to happen, reversed his engine and applied his steam-brake, but was too late to avert the disaster.

The collision was clearly due to driver West’s action in running past his junction signal when it was at danger, and on him must rest the whole responsibility for the collision. This man acknowledges that when he first saw the junction signal it was at danger, but states that when he looked a second time he saw some signal off, which he mistook for his junction signal. He is quite unable to say which signal it was that he mistook for his signal. As already explained, the junction signal (No. 4) and starting-signal (No. 9) were off for the excursion train, and he may have mistaken one of these, it does not matter which, for his signal (No. 2). There is no reason why he should have mistaken one signal for the other, and the error he fell into can only be attributed to great carelessness on his part. It is fair to add that West gave his evidence in a manner which convinced me that he wished to tell the truth, and he made no attempt to excuse himself.

Driver West has been 18 years in the service of the Somerset and Dorset Railway, and has been a driver for 10 years. He had been on duty about four hours at the time of the collision. It is my duty to draw attention to this man’s hours of work, the actual hours on the night of the 9th July amounting to 13 hours 10 minutes and the booked hours on the 10th to 11 hours 37 minutes respectively. These are too long, and so far as the 9th July is concerned may be regarded as excessive. The same remarks apply to the hours of fireman Lewis.

No blame whatever is to be attached to the drivers of the two engines on the excursion train, but I am somewhat puzzled to account for signalman Perry’s action in keeping his signals against the excursion train and thereby checking its speed until it was within 500 yards of his signal-box. Looking at the fact that he had received the “Warning” signal for the goods train at 10.4 p.m., and that he was momentarily expecting to hear that it had left the upper station, it is not altogether improbable that he intended, if possible, to let the goods train through the junction before the excursion, and for this reason kept his signals against the latter as long as possible. Perry’s own explanation of his action is that he wished to make sure that the goods train had come to a dead stand at the junction before he allowed the excursion to pass; that he wished, in fact, to guard against the very event which occurred. But there was
nothing in his regulations to cause him to do this, and if in the exercise of his discretion he thought it right with this object in view, to keep his signals against the excursion train until it came in sight, it is difficult to understand why his discretion did not carry him further and cause him to accept the excursion train under the caution arrangement and bring it to a stop at the junction until he had ascertained what the goods train was doing. At any rate his action in checking the excursion train without stopping it altogether was unfortunate, for it is possible that if its speed had not been reduced it would have cleared the junction before the goods train reached it. However, as he kept the signals against the goods train from the first, which if obeyed, would have ensured the safety of the other train, and as nothing can be held to justify a driver's action in running past a signal at danger, I do not consider Perry can be held responsible for the collision.

Goods guard Brewer is deserving of censure for not applying his brake so as to assist the driver while the goods train was running down the incline. As so often happens, this guard was making up his book instead of looking after the safety of his train, and watching the signals. He had been on duty 3 hours 40 minutes when the collision occurred.

Although it cannot be said in this case that the signalling of Templecombe junction was the direct cause of the disaster, I am not able to regard the signals at this place as satisfactory. No. 4 junction signal, which applies to the line from Wimborne, is so situated with regard to Nos. 2 and 5, which apply to the up upper road from the South-Western station, that they change sides as seen from an engine approaching the junction on the Wimborne line. This is a most objectionable arrangement, and can be obviated by moving the post which carries Nos. 2 and 5 signals back till it is abreast of No. 4 post. Then again, No. 23 signal, which applies to the down upper road, is carried on the same post as No. 4 junction signal, which applies to the Somerset and Dorset main line from Wimborne. The up distant from No. 3 box is badly placed, and is not repeated on the same post as and below the up starting signal from No. 2 box, and, generally speaking, it would be desirable that the signals at the junction should be re-arranged on more modern principles.

Moreover, the whole system of working at this junction is unsatisfactory. There are three block telegraph codes in use in the junction signal box, viz., the Somerset and Dorset train tablet code for the single line from Wimborne, ordinary double line code between the junction and No. 3 box, and a special code between the South-Western box at the upper station and the junction; and the work and mental strain of the signalman must be much increased by having so many systems to remember and act upon. Of course there must be two codes in use here owing to the fact that a single line joins a double line, but the third code is necessary because the South-Western block telegraph regulations for double lines differ from those in use on the Somerset and Dorset line, and a special code has been compiled for use over the line between the South-Western signal box at the station and the Somerset and Dorset signal box at the junction. It is unfortunate that one code of block telegraph regulations for double lines is not adopted by all companies. The method of working at this junction permits two and even three trains to approach the junction simultaneously from different directions. In the case of trains approaching simultaneously on the Somerset and Dorset line the second of the trains would be accepted by the signalman under the caution, i.e., "Section clear and junction blocked" signal; but as the South-Western Railway Company do not use this signal, a train may be permitted to leave the upper station (as was the case with the goods train which caused the collision) without any caution, although the junction may be blocked. I do not regard it as proper block working to allow two trains to approach a junction simultaneously on converging lines under any circumstances, but if it is absolutely necessary under present conditions, as is stated to be the case, to allow two or more trains to approach Templecombe No. 2 junction on converging lines at the same time, it would appear to be essential that the driver of each train except the first, should be cautioned that he may expect to find the junction blocked. And assuming that it may be necessary to permit two or more passenger trains to approach the junction at the same time, in order to allow one train to connect with another, or to clear the platform at the station, there can be no such reason for permitting a goods train to approach the junction at the same time as a passenger train, and I would recommend that the signalman at this junction should in future be prohibited from permitting goods trains to approach the junction on a converging line, whether with or without the caution signal, after he has accepted a passenger train. Had such a rule been in force the collision under consideration would not have taken place.

As most of the difficulty of working the traffic through this junction in a proper manner is due to the want of accommodation for trains in the South-Western station,
I am strongly of opinion that a second passenger platform for the Somerset and Dorset trains should be constructed without delay in this station.

But the only way to render this station and junction thoroughly satisfactory is to carry out the scheme, which has been often been proposed, of constructing a branch line from the Somerset and Dorset Railway south of Templecombe so as to form a running line through the latter station, which would join the Somerset and Dorset main line again at Templecombe junction. The new platform and the res-signalling of the junction already suggested by me would form part of the larger and more comprehensive scheme, and might therefore be put in hand at once. And having regard to the position of the two railway companies, viz., the Midland and the London and South-Western, who are the joint owners of the Somerset and Dorset line, and to the important traffic now passing through Templecombe, I would submit that the directors of the two companies should be pressed to take early steps to remedy the extremely unsatisfactory condition of this junction.

The Assistant Secretary,
Railway Department, Board of Trade.

Signed) H. A. YORKE
Major, R.E.

APPENDIX.

DAMAGE TO ENGINES AND ROLLING STOCK.

No. 57 Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway goods engine.—Left-hand foot-plate broken and bent up at leading end; left-hand top step broken; left-hand injector broken; left-hand injector overflow cock-plug broken; left-hand feed-pipe bent; left-hand brake bracket broken.

Tender.—Left-hand top step knocked off; left-hand foot-plate trailing and knocked up; left-hand trailing axle-box oil-cap broken off.

No. 10 Midland Railway drawing-room car—Underframe.—6 diagonals broken; 7 axle-gardens broken; 1 bearing-bar broken; 1 bolster-cresting broken; 1 sole-bar split; 1 headstock split; 6 side-bearing springs' plates shifted; 1 cast-iron side-plate broken; 1 spring-bar damaged; 1 brake-shoe broken; 2 coil-springs bent; 2 axle-boxes broken.

Body.—23 bottom-quarter panels damaged; 26 side mouldings damaged; 2 bottom barn damaged; 1 end-bar casting broken; 2 bottom boards broken; 2 end-bars split; 2 step-sides broken; 2 steps damaged; 2 transverse bent; 1 corner pillar slightly damaged.

No. 4, 1,270 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—9 step-irons broken and bent; 2 step-boards broken.

Body.—3 end panels broken; 2 bottom-quarter panels broken; 1 waist panel broken; 1 upright panel broken; 2 door-panels broken; 1 corner pillar and rails split; 3 quarter-light mouldings damaged; 1 door-head broken; 1 commode-handle broken; 2 side pillars broken.

No. 1,284 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—1 axle-box broken; 2 step-boards broken; 8 step-irons broken and bent.

Body.—2 bottom quarter panels broken; 3 end panels broken; 2 corner pillars damaged; 1 standing pillar damaged; 4 quarter-light mouldings damaged; 2 quarter-light glasses broken; 1 door-panel broken; 2 doors damaged; 2 door-light glasses broken; roof-end damaged; 1 inside door damaged; 1 door-handle broken; 1 luggage door-bolt bent.

No. 1,313 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—6 step-irons broken and bent; 1 step-board end damaged.

Body.—2 bottom quarter panels broken; 5 door-hinges broken and bent; 4 end panels broken; 2 corner pillars damaged; 1 quarter-light broken; 1 door-handle broken; 1 commode-handle broken; 2 end steps bent.

No. 1,314 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—1 headstock broken; 1 headstock damaged; 2 step-boards broken; 3 axle-boxes broken; 2 axle-paddles bent; 1 draw-bar plate broken; 1 draw-bar broken; 1 draw-bar bent; 1 buffer-rod bent; 6 step-irons broken and bent; 1 vacuum-brake connection pipe broken.

Body.—1 bottom quarter panel broken; 2 doors broken; 12 mouldings broken; 1 door-handle broken; 1 luggage door-handle bent.

No. 1,325 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—1 headstock broken; 2 step-boards broken; 6 step-irons broken and bent; 2 connection shackles bent; 1 draw-bar bent; 1 draw-bar plate broken; 1 buffer-cylinder broken.

Body.—1 corner pillar split; 2 end pillars broken; 1 bottom quarter panel split; 1 side-light panel split; 1 waist panel split; 1 top panel split; 5 door-hinges broken and bent; 1 standing pillar split; 4 door-pillars split and damaged; 4 end panels split; 2 pillar mouldings broken; 5 end mouldings broken; 1 door-light broken; 5 doors damaged.

No. 1,622 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—7 step-irons broken and bent; 2 step-boards broken.

Body.—2 bottom quarter panels split; 1 waist panel split; 1 top panel split; 1 commode-handle broken; 1 bottom door-hinge broken; 1 bottom side moulding damaged.

No. 1,623 Midland Railway third-class saloon—Underframe.—1 headstock broken; 2 step-boards broken; 1 buffer-cylinder broken; 1 vacuum-brake connection pipe broken; 2 step-irons broken and bent; 2 buffers bent; 1 draw-bar bent.

Body.—1 bottom quarter panel broken; 1 quarter light broken; 1 door-light broken; 2 end steps bent; 8 end panels broken; 3 top panels broken; 2 corner pillar mouldings broken; 1 standing pillar mouldings broken.

No. 1,739 Midland Railway passenger van.—Underframe.—1 axle-box broken; 1 draw-bar bent; 2 step-boards broken; 1 draw-bar plate broken; 2 buffers bent.

Body.—1 bottom side moulding damaged.

No. 15 Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway 10-ton goods van.—2 step-irons bent; 1 long step-board broken.

No. 198 Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway High goods waggon.—1 draw-bar bent; bottom knuckled out.

No. 747 Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway box waggon.—1 brake-gear bent.

No. 842 Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway High goods waggon.—Slight damage to underframe.

No. 958 Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway High goods waggon.—Slight damage to underframe.
goods waggon.—Side slightly damaged; 1 axle-box broken; 1 headstock damaged.

No. 7068 P. Bird & Co.'s waggon.—1 axle-box broken; 1 draw-bar bent; 1 owner's plate broken.

No. 555 Frances Countess Waldegrave waggon.—2 spring shoes knocked off.

No. 2 Somerset Trading Co.'s waggon.—1 brake-guard bent; 1 door step damaged.

No. 1,123 Wheeler and Gregory waggon.—Side slightly damaged.

No. 3 Yeovil Gas Co.'s waggon.—1 spring shoe knocked off.

No. 7 Yeovil Gas Co.'s waggon.—1 side slightly damaged; 2 axle-guards bent; 1 brake-guard bent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Damage to Permanent Way</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sleepers, down line -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do., up line -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chairs, down line -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do., up line -</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crossing-chairs -</td>
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Copings of bridge slightly damaged.

Printed copies of the above Report were sent to the Company on the 17th September.

LONDON, BRIGHTON, AND SOUTH COAST RAILWAY.

Board of Trade, (Railway Department.),
8, Richmond Terrace, Whitehall, London, S.W.,
18th August 1894.

Sir,

I have the honour to report, for the information of the Board of Trade, in compliance with the instructions contained in the Order of the 24th ultimo, the result of my inquiry into the circumstances attending a fatal accident, which occurred on the 23rd ultimo at Farlington junction, on the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway.

In this case, as the 6.45 p.m. down London and South-Western train from Havant to Cosham was running off the main line on to the Cosham branch at Farlington junction at about 6.51 p.m., the engine and the whole of the train left the rails. The engine ran along the main line, and came to a stand off the rails, partly in the 4-ft. way of the up main line and partly in the 6-ft. way, 179 yards west of the junction facing-points, the only portion of the train remaining attached to it being the under-frame of the leading vehicle, a brake-van, upside down, the body of this vehicle having been broken up, and apparently having been dashed against a signal-post and a telegraph-post standing at the up end of the up platform, in the angle between the main line and the branch, both of which posts were knocked down. The remaining vehicles, viz., a third-class carriage, a second-class carriage, a first-class carriage, a third-class carriage, and another brake-van, were on the branch, all off the rails, the leading third-class carriage being upset on the end of the up platform against the steps leading up to a foot-bridge, the second-class carriage being on its side partly on the platform and partly across the two branch lines, and the three others, on their wheels, being diagonally across the branch, the two rear vehicles being foul of the down branch line only. The leading carriage, which was upset, was 161 yards from the junction facing-points.

The guard of the train, Henry King, who had been riding in the front brake-van, was found lying terribly injured alongside the wreck of his van, and died within half an hour, and six passengers were injured.

A return of the damages to the rolling-stock and permanent-way, which were considerable, is appended.

Description.

At Farlington junction, which is the next station west of Havant, the branch line leading to Cosham diverges towards the north-west from the London, Brighton, and South Coast main line to Portsmouth, there running from east to west, the facing-points of the junction being on the down main line.

Both the branch and the main lines are the property of the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway Company, but the London and South-Western Railway Company have running powers, and the service between Cosham, a joint station, and Havant is performed by London and South-Western trains.

There is an intermediate block-signal at Bedhampton, between Havant and Farlington junction, distant 2 miles 19 chains from the latter.

There is nothing remarkable about the junction, the main line being nearly straight, and the branch leaving it on an easy curve of about half a mile radius, on which there is no real obstruction of about one inch.
Diagram showing position of tracks and curvature after collision.

TEMPLECOMBE JUNCTION LINE.
SOMERSET AND DORSET JOIN IT RAILWAY.

Note: Position of lines after collision shown in red.

10th July 1894

Dated 26th August 1894

Please note to accompany Major Forbes' report.